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The NATO intervention in the wars in the former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1999 
illustrated the importance of South Eastern Europe to Atlantic security.  In 2005, certain 
of the southern Slav nations have gained NATO and EU membership, as in the case of 
Slovenia, or have drawn ever closer to qualifying for membership, as in the case of 
Croatia and Bulgaria.  However, Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
have proved more difficult to draw into the European fold due to the lingering effects of 
the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
This thesis explores Serbia’s ongoing attempts to integrate into EU and NATO 
structures.  It begins with the background of the situation in Serbia of 2005 with a focus 
on the historical leadership, management, and missions of the security sector.  It then 
examines the development and objectives of the security sector reform agenda and the 
challenges facing its practitioners.  Additionally, this thesis analyses the impact of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Kosovo final status disposition, and the 
chaotic domestic political situation on Serbian reform efforts. 
This thesis argues that, as a result of political and social circumstances unique to 
Serbia as well as the institutional shortcomings of the West as concerns comprehensive 
democratic reform of power and arms, the ongoing SSR efforts in Serbia will take several 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As Communism declined in the late 1980s, Yugoslavia was, in many 
ways, better placed than any other communist state to make the transition 
to multi-party democracy, either as a single state, or as a group of 
successor states.  There was a real chance for Yugoslavia to take its place 
in a new and, at that time, hopeful community of European nations.1
A. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
1. Introduction 
In 1995, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), saw the conflict in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as a threat to European security and intervened with force.  
In May of 1995 NATO conducted limited air strikes against Serb targets in BiH, in June a 
NATO Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was deployed to Bosnia, and on 30 August 1995 
NATO launched Operation DELIBERATE FORCE.2  NATO efforts in BiH ended the 
fighting in BiH and led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995.3  
Events in the Balkans were again in the forefront of NATO policy in 1999.  In March, 
NATO went to war, for the first time, against Yugoslavia -- the republics of Serbia and 
Montenegro were all that was left of Yugoslavia, thus the war was in reality a war against 
Serbia.4  NATO’s military efforts in the Balkans were to stop the worst ethnically 
motivated killing in Europe since the Second World War, but were also to prevent the 
spread of instability in Southeast Europe to other parts of the continent, especially into 
NATO member countries Greece and Turkey.5
After hostilities ended, the European Union (EU), the United States and NATO 
established ties with Yugoslavia as soon as possible.  Slobodan Milosevic’s removal from 
power enabled NATO to welcome Yugoslavia into the South East Europe Initiatives 
(SEEI) and associated programs (2001).  In addition, the EU launched the European 
 
1 Laura Silber and Allan Little., Yugoslavia Death of a Nation. (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1996), 26. 
2 Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institute Press , 2000), xv-xviii. 
3 Ibid, 137. 
4 Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon., Winning Ugly, NATO’s War to Save Kosovo. (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institute Press , 2000). 
5 Ibid, p. 1 and Craig R. Nation, War in the Balkans 1991-2002 (Strategic Studies Institute, August 2003), 229-
230. 
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Union-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Consultative Task Force (EU-FRY CTF) (also in 
2001), and the US extended Support for East European Democracy (SEED) funds to the 
country in 2002.6  The aftermath of NATO’s operations in the former Yugoslavia has 
been an effort by the Alliance and the European Union (EU) to bring stability, not only to 
the countries that once comprised up Yugoslavia, but to the entire region. 
Instability in the western and central Balkans has the potential in 2005 and 
beyond, once more, to intensify a source of turmoil that has long plagued Europe.  The 
historical conflicts in this area of Europe have evolved into present-day concerns over 
democratic transition, military reform, and ethnic conflict, along with many other issues.  
The EU and the US must comprehend and surmount the obstacles to Serbia’s integration 
into Europe, encourage its efforts at necessary reforms, and provide appropriate support 
for those efforts   U.S. policymakers are currently grappling with the issue of how to 
encourage Serbian reform, which will guarantee peace and stability in the Balkan region 
for the foreseeable future.  Any progress made in bringing Serbia closer to EU and 
NATO structures and in their adopting the values of these organizations will strengthen 
the possibility for peace and stability. 
When former Communist countries are examined by policy makers and scholars 
with an eye to democratic reform, the armed forces and interior ministries are usually key 
areas for change.  In most, if not all of the former communist countries, some of the most 
blatant abuses and anti-democratic activities occurred in these sectors.  They are also two 
of the most difficult areas to reform.  One of the ways the NATO allies and the EU 
stabilized and democratized the former communist countries of Eastern Europe has been 
by reforming the security sector in these nations.  As the former communist countries of 
Eastern Europe began to express their desire to join NATO and other “western” 
structures operating in Europe, the academic study of Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
developed.  This field of study was driven by the need to establish requirements and 
methods for reform and western integration. 
 
6 NATO Fact Sheets, South East Europe Initiative, http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2001/seei.htm, accessed 24 
October 2005; Europa, European Union, Enlargement, EU-Serbia and Montenegro Relations, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/serbia_montenegro/serbia_montenegro_eu_relations.htm, accessed 3 December 
2005; US State Department Website, FY02 SEED ACT Report, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/23582.htm, accessed 
30 October 2005. 
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2. Purpose 
This study examines the SSR process developed and used by international 
organizations and analyzes how it has impacted Serbia’s efforts to integrate into EU and 
NATO structures.  This thesis examines the roots of Serbia’s deeply flawed security 
sector, analyzes existing programs for security sector reform, and determines if Serbia is 
making progress toward EU and NATO integration through its application of SSR 
theories and practice.  Furthermore, this thesis analyzes additional issues that impact 
Serbia’s ability and commitment to reform. 
This thesis focuses on the security sector reforms undertaken by Serbia since 2000 
in its effort to integrate into EU and NATO structures.  It specifically focuses on ongoing 
efforts to complete the Stabilization and Association process (SAp), conclude a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), and gain entry into NATO’s 
“Partnership for Peace” (PfP) program. 
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that current SSR efforts in Serbia are 
not bringing the country closer to its stated goal of EU and NATO integration.  There are 
three reasons for this.  First, there are unique roots to the Serbian problem that continue to 
persist despite both internal and external reform efforts.  Second, international SSR 
efforts are unfocused and ineffective.  And finally, the issues of Kosovo’s final status, 
lack of national support for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, and domestic political fragmentation all interfere with Serbia’s ability to 
focus on and make progress in reform. 
3. Significance 
In September 2004, the United States European Command (USEUCOM) Joint 
Analysis Center provided the Naval Postgraduate School with a list of research topics for 
NPS students to pursue.7  Also, General James Jones, the EUCOM Commander and 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) expressed the goal of “gradual 
integration into the Partnership for Peace Program” for Serbia and Montenegro in 
comments about the increasing importance of the Balkan region to the Unites States and 
 
7 United States European Command Joint Analysis Center, Memorandum for Commander, Naval Post-Graduate 
School, 1 September 2004. 
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NATO.8  This thesis speaks directly to the importance of Serbia to Euro-Atlantic 
institutions and the country’s efforts to implement democratic reform. 
B. ARGUMENTS AND MAJOR QUESTIONS 
The major question this thesis examines is, Can Serbia overcome its history of 
conflict and instability and make significant progress toward EU and NATO membership 
by meeting the requirements for a Stabilization and Association Agreement and 
membership in PfP through security sector reform?  Other questions include:  How did 
Serbia come to be in its current state of political and institutional dysfunction?  What are 
the ongoing efforts by Serbia and the international community to bring about Security 
Sector Reform?  What are the other main challenges facing Serbia in its effort to integrate 
into western institutions?  And what are the prospects for successful reform in Serbia? 
This study argues that Serbia currently lacks a sufficient amount of public and 
political commitment to meet the reform requirements necessary for European integration 
and will not achieve integration in the near future (i.e., the next five years).  It will take a 
significant amount of time to build the public and political will and the ability to 
accomplish the necessary reforms due to the lack of a functioning democracy.  In 
addition, Serbia must initiate significant and fundamental cultural changes in its value 
system.  Finally the ordinary Serbian citizen as well as powerful politicians and 
criminals, must make extreme sacrifices. 
The topic of the Yugoslav state and its history has been popular since the 1960s.  
Initially, Yugoslavia was a topic of interest because of its break with the Soviet Union 
ands its subsequent leadership of the non-aligned movement.  Josip Broz Tito’s ability to 
survive Josef Stalin’s displeasure was of great interest to scholars of the Soviet bloc. 
The later explosion of literature on Yugoslavia came as a result of the collapse of 
the state and the devastating wars that followed.  Most of this literature was produced in 
the mid to late 1990s.  John Lampe, Pedro Ramet, Tim Judah, Christopher Bennett and 
Leslie Benson provide a detailed background for the events of the 1990s.9  Their 
 
8 The Center for Southeast European Studies (CSEES), “General James Jones Describes US European Command 
Transformation:  Southeastern Europe A Major Consideration,” CSEES Analysis, 
http://www.csees.net/?page=analyses&a_id=48.  Accessed 30 October 2005. 
9 John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000); Pedro Ramet, ed. Yugoslavia in the 1980s (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985); Tim 
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accounts demonstrate the complex issues plaguing the Yugoslav state from its inception 
until the emergence of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia.  The personal accounts of Warren 
Zimmerman, the last American ambassador in Belgrade, provide details of the final 
years, and months before war erupted in 1991.10  Laura Silber and Alan Little, as well as 
Judah, Zimmerman, Ivo Daalder, and Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon, provide accounts 
of the conflicts that engulfed Yugoslavia in the 1990s.11
The process of security sector reform for Eastern European nations desiring to 
join NATO and the EU has been chronicled by Jeffrey Simon and Marybeth Peterson 
Ulrich as well as many scholars contributing to publications for the Geneva Center for 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the Bonn International Center for Conversion, 
Journal of Security Sector Management, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development.  These secondary sources include a wealth of information on 
necessary measures, methods for achieving successful reform of the security sector and 
impediments to such reform.  These writings cover developments within particular 
countries in the political and security sector arenas.  To a large extent, events in the 
political arena determine what will happen in all other areas of the country.  The impetus 
for change either emanates from  within the political system that houses the security 
sector or emanates from the citizens of a nation (if they are organized and well led well). 
Certain of the scholars writing about security sector reform focus on the 
shortcomings in the effort to implement the concepts and agenda.  Ulrich, in her analysis 
of defense reform in the Czech Republic and Russia, contends that there have been too 
many programs and not enough coordination to capitalize on opportunities for needed 
reform.12  The underdevelopment of the SSR concept is also the focus of Jane Chanaa’s 
 
Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven and London: Yale Nota Bene, Yale University Press, 2002); 
Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse–Causes, Course and Consequences (Washington Square, New 
York: New York University Press, 1995); Leslie Benson, Yugoslavia, A Concise History (Great Britain: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004). 
10 Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers (New York: Times Books, 
Random House, 1996). 
11 Tim Judah. Kosovo: War and Revenge; Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia 
Policy; Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo. 
12 Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed 
Forces (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2000). 
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work.13  Heiner Hanggi also agrees that the practitioners fail to coordinate SSR and build 
a common model.14  All of these authors seem to agree that although the concept of 
security sector reform is important and necessary, the international SSR efforts, so far, 
have failed to consolidate working models.  This segment of the literature also defines 
security sector reform, clarifies what reform programs might encompass, and catalogues 
expected outcomes of successful programs. 
Serbia’s progress in reforming since the October, 2000 ousting of Slobodan 
Milosevic by the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) is the subject of several 
primary source accounts.  From 2002 to 2004, the European Union published annual 
Stabilization and Association Reports for Yugoslavia/Serbia and Montenegro.15  The 
reports were produced as part of the process of Serbia and Montenegro, either as one state 
entity or as independent states, forging closer association with the EU with the goal of 
eventual EU membership. 
The Congressional Research Service (Library of Congress) publishes several 
reports annually on the current situation in Serbia and Montenegro and U.S. policy 
regarding the state union.  The International Crisis Group, the United States Institute of 
Peace, the U.S. State Department, the Conflict Studies Research Centre, and the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies have all published reports illuminating reform 
developments in Serbia’s political, defense, and security sectors.  The overriding theme 
of these reports is Serbia’s almost complete lack of progress, mainly due to political 
infighting, corruption, and a lack of institutional knowledge. 
C. OVERVIEW 
Chapter II begins with an overview of Yugoslav history from the Second World 
War to the initiation of hostilities in the early 1990s and mainly focuses on the 
organizational and political legacy of the armed forces and police services.  Examining 
 
13 Jane Chanaa, Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
14 Alan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi, eds., Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2004). 
15 Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Paper. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
Stabilization and Association Report. 2002; Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working 
Paper, Serbia and Montenegro Stabilization and Association Report, 2003; Commission of the European Communities, 
Commission Staff Working Paper. Serbia and Montenegro Stabilization and Association Report. 2004. 
7 
the foundation of the security sector components in Serbia and Montenegro facilitates a 
better understanding and evaluation of the current situation. 
Chapter III examines the SSR literature and establishes expected behavior and 
expected outcomes related to SSR activities.  The goals of SSR are outlined.  This is 
followed by an explanation of the methods for achieving those goals, common pitfalls 
and challenges, and the expected evolution of SSR efforts.  Next, national and 
international SSR efforts in Serbia and Montenegro are examined.  Finally, Serbia and 
Montenegro’s SSR progress from 2001 to 2005 is evaluated. 
Chapter IV outlines additional challenges Serbia and Montenegro face in addition 
to the need to reform the security sector.  The issues of The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Kosovo’s final status, and domestic political 
instability all impact developments in the security sector, and in turn are also impacted by 
these developments. 
The conclusion summarizes the findings in the three main chapters to show how 
they support the thesis that Serbia, while making some progress toward commitment to 
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II. BACKGROUND OF SITUATION IN SERBIA, 1944 TO 2005 
A. FROM 1945 TO THE DEATH OF JOSIP BROZ TITO 
1. Introduction 
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia emerged after World War II as an 
independent, communist state with Josip Broz Tito as its head.  Tito quickly consolidated 
his power and took steps to divide the country so that no one national group, especially 
the Serbs, could dominate the federation.  The federation eventually consisted of six 
republics–Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Slovenia- 
and two autonomous regions within Serbia–Vojvodina and Kosovo.  Tito eliminated all 
sources of opposition to his power by accusing opponents of wartime collaboration.16  
Tito’s employed the Stalinist tactic of eliminating “enemies of the state” in order to 
consolidate his hold on power. 
The 25 years were spent establishing Yugoslavia’s place in the communist and 
wider world.  This was especially necessary after the 1948 split with the Soviet Union 
and the less than optimal functioning of the economy, which was intensified by a Soviet 
bloc trade embargo.17  By the 1960’s, Yugoslavia settled into the role of leader of the 
unaligned movement and became a country which, in its quasi-liberal economic policies, 
limited freedoms, and partial openness, appeared to be somewhere between the east and 
west.18  Yugoslavia was a communist country with no ties to the main pro-Soviet 
governments in the world and no desire to become a western-style democracy.  After 
Tito’s break with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia became a purchaser of American 
armament and concluded a security agreement with NATO in 1953.19  The country also 
received significant aid from the west, especially France, Great Britain, and the United 
States during the years of economic hardship and food shortages during the early 
1950s.20  The U.S. continued to be a major source of aid and loans until the 1980s. 
 
16 Glenn E. Curtis, ed. Yugoslavia: A Country Study, (Federal Research Division, Library of Congress), 44. 
17 Ibid, 47. 
18 Ibid, 48, 50.  The Yugoslav regime, “relaxed its religious restrictions, allowed for a degree of public criticism, 
curbed abuses of privileges by party officials, and reduced the powers of the secret police.” 
19 Ibid, 47. 
20 Lampe, 253. 
10 
                                                
As regards Yugoslavia’s history from 1945 to 1980, three particular issues 
significantly impacted the events of the 1990s and the current state of affairs in Serbia.  
The three issues were a) the rise of ethnic tensions and nationalism; b) the state of the 
Yugoslav economy; c) the 1974 constitution and the domestic political path it established 
for Yugoslavia.  Each of these issues played a role in the violent collapse of Yugoslavia.  
Examining these factors reveals that the events of the 1990s were a direct result of 
choices made by Tito and the Yugoslav communist party. 
2. The Rise of Nationalism and Ethnic Divisions 
From 1941 to 1944, Yugoslavia was host to both a world war and a civil war.  
During the civil war, the fascist government of the Independent State of Croatia 
(Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska, NDH), killed thousands of Jews, Gypsies, and Serbs and 
forced the religious conversion of Serbs and Muslims.  Chetniks, a mostly Serbian group, 
killed Partisans, a group comprised of all of Yugoslavia’s ethnic communities.  In a 
situation that Misha Glenny described as “fratricide,” widespread killing took place and 
usually pitted individuals from one ethnic group against members of a different ethnic 
group.  Most of the killing was based on political and ideological differences; however, 
ethnic overtones also existed.  Tragically, all of Yugoslavia’s constituent ethnicities 
perpetrated atrocities. 
After the war, the government made no attempts to investigate, try, or punish 
those who might have been guilty of atrocities.  There was no attempt at “Truth and 
Reconciliation,” and there was no lustration.  Instead, those who were “tried,” and in 
many cases executed, suffered that fate because they were deemed “enemies of the state.”  
Perhaps the task of uncovering the truth was too daunting a task.  Perhaps Josip Tito did 
not want to address the issue because he too was guilty of what would be considered war 
crimes.  In any case, the history of inter-Yugoslav atrocities was officially suppressed.21  
Unfortunately, among individual Yugoslavs in a majority of the republics, these atrocities 
were neither forgotten nor forgiven and the horrors of this earlier period would return to 
destroy the “brotherhood and unity” Tito struggled to create. 
 
21 Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 (New York: Viking, 2000), 
545. 
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Beginning in the late 1960s, Yugoslavia saw the open reemergence of ethnic 
tension and nationalism.  Economic troubles pushed ethnic divisions to the fore as the 
more affluent republics to the north objected to having to subsidize the southern 
republics.  The divisions Tito had managed to squelch following the Second World War 
began to surface again.  Economic hardship caused intra-republic tension, and a 
loosening of repression allowed dissidents to air their grievances.  Although protests in 
Croatia and Slovenia tended to be of the written and spoken variety, among Yugoslavia’s 
Albanians the dissidence took the form of demonstrations that were often large and 
violent.22  In retrospect, these upheavals of the late 1960s and early 1970s were the 
beginning of Yugoslavia’s demise.  In addition, ongoing political decentralization would 
corrode the country’s unity and the government’s ability to exert control of the country.  
The structural changes in the government were implemented via constitutional 
amendments and eventually a new constitution.23
Along with the violent demonstrations in Kosovo, the government had to contend 
with the Croatian Spring in the wake of the Czechoslovak prototype ca. 1971.  
Intellectuals in Croatia began to voice their displeasure over the subordination of the 
Croatian language, the large part of the federal budget burden borne by Croatia, and the 
perceived predominance of Serbs within the federation.24  Street demonstrations soon 
appeared in Croatia along with calls for even greater autonomy than granted by previous 
constitutional amendments.  Tito dealt with this apparent break in the country’s unity by 
reestablishing the preeminence of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) and 
purging dissenters from governmental posts.  However, Croatia’s historical lack of faith 
in the Yugoslav idea and the predilection of the Serbs to dominate Yugoslavia continued.  
The Croat and Slovene viewpoint that their more prosperous republics were being 
drained of resources in order to subsidize the poorer regions of the country created 








                                                
 
3. The 1974 Constitution 
From 1945 to 1991, Yugoslavia had a total of four constitutions (1946, 1953, 
1963, and 1974) with a host of amendments to each constitution.25  These documents 
tended to be verbose and laid out complicated formulas for the operation of the 
government.  According to Yugoslav historian John Lampe, one of the reasons for the 
rewrite, which eventually became the 1974 Constitution, was the “mind-boggling 
complexity” of previous constitutional arrangements.26  William Bennett described the 
constitution as being “absurd in length … virtually untranslatable and largely 
nonsensical.”27  The 1974 constitution was primarily drafted under the direction of Tito 
and Edvard Kardelj.  Yugoslavia’s four constitutions were drafted by Kardelj, a man 
whom Lampe describes as, “Tito’s Slovenian ideologue.”28
Besides simplifying the workings of the government, the 1974 constitution was 
written with Tito’s age in mind and intended to preserve a peaceful and united 
Yugoslavia after his death.  It was an attempt to stem the liberal tide that had 
characterized Yugoslav socialism, to make the Albanians of Kosovo feel as if they were 
an equal and respected part of the country, and to curtail actual and potential nationalist 
and separatist movements by relinquishing more control and autonomy to the republics.29
In order to halt the spread of liberalism, the constitution created an electoral 
system that excluded the forward looking and successful Yugoslavs whose communist 
credentials were questionable, in favor of less capable party hacks.30  This, along with a 
purge conducted in 1971, put communist ideologues in control of the party and 
government. 
The autonomy granted to Kosovo and Vojvodina was principally aimed at co-
opting the Albanians in Kosovo and quelling the unrest that had begun in the region in 
 
25 Lampe, 312. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Bennett, Christopher, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse–Causes, Course and Consequences, (Washington Square, 
New York: New York University Press, 1995), 74. 
28 Lampe, 3, 234. 
29 Bennett, 70-77. 
30 Ibid, 72. 
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1968.  Yugoslavia’s Albanians lived in appalling conditions.  They had the lowest 
literacy and highest poverty rates in the country.  From the beginning of communist rule 
in Yugoslavia, they were subject to constant repression and a lack of rights and 
opportunities.31  Tito hoped the 1974 constitution would create a more peaceful 
relationship with the Albanians and bring them into “mainstream” Yugoslavia. 
The constitution also devolved additional control down to the republic level.  As 
with the Kosovo related constitutional changes, this was aimed at creating stability and 
addressing “local” concerns.  Tito hoped to eliminate the Croatian separatist movement 
as a source of conflict and division in the federation.  Along with devolving more power 
to the republics, Tito had previously purged the Croatian League of Communists in 1971.  
Both he and Kardelj hoped the devolution of power and the purges would be enough to 
quell Croatia’s growing separatist movement. 
At the time it was presented for ratification, the 1974 Constitution was “the 
world’s longest with 406 articles,” it also “created the most complicated electoral system 
seen anywhere during the twentieth century.”32  The 1974 constitution is best known for 
two features; first, the aforementioned autonomy that it granted Kosovo, and that sparked 
the violence during the collapse of the country in 1990 and 91, and second, the collective 
presidency it created caused the Yugoslav government to become utterly dysfunctional.33  
The plan for governing Yugoslavia after Tito was intended to create a system in which, 
“every republic and autonomous province had equal access to positions of power.”34  
This desire was manifested in the collective presidency, a nine-person committee (a 
representative from each republic and province and the LCY president) whose decisions 
had to be reached by unanimity.  By refusing to agree to an issue on the table, a single 
republic or province would in essence cast a veto that could not be overridden. 
Thus the 1974 constitution unwittingly generated a series of crisis that would 
eventually lead to the destruction of Yugoslavia.  It gave Kosovo a level of autonomy that 
 
31 Bennett, 71. 
32 Lampe, 313, See Lampe for a description of the rules used for selecting delegates and delegations. 
33 Lampe writes that “The requirement for unanimous agreement among the republics and provincial 
representatives in their Chamber as well as in the collective presidency proved to be the major political failing of the 
1974 constitution from the top down.” 313. 
34 Bennett, 74. 
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was unacceptable to Serbia.  It created a ruling committee composed of members of 
separate republics that possessed a large degree of autonomy and had conflicting 
interests.  Also, it halted the advance of liberalization within the communist party that 
might have led to political and economic solutions capable of prolonging peaceful 
coexistence within the federation. 
4. Economic Troubles 
An inefficient socialist economy, enormous foreign loans, unwise and limited 
investments, two world oil shocks, and an inability to create a better standard of living in 
its poorer republics and provinces all contributed to Yugoslavia’s collapse.35
From the beginning of his rule, Tito found it difficult to develop an effective 
economic identity for Yugoslavia.36  Economic experiments included: “socialist self-
management” in the early 1950s, the “dissolving of collective farms in 1953,” economic 
reforms through the 1950s, market socialism in the early 1960s, opening the economy to 
foreign investments, and obtaining foreign loans in the late 1960s.  Yet the Yugoslav 
government could never find the right formula and entered the 1970s with worsening 
economic problems.37  According to Christopher Bennett, a combination of political 
conservatism and worker concerns kept real market reform from taking place.38
The oil crises of 1973 and 1979 also ravaged Yugoslavia’s economy.39  The 
consequences of the failure to find a solution to the country’s economic woes were non-
profitable business enterprises, a loss of real income by Yugoslavia’s industrial workers, 
drastic cost saving measures by businesses to remain profitable, strikes by blue-and 
white-collar workers, and “poverty, emigration and unemployment.”40  Many Yugoslavs 
went abroad (mostly to West Germany) to find employment and to earn enough to 
support their families back at home.41
 
35 Bennett, 67-69. 
36 Although Lampe describes the Yugoslav economy as continuing to “expand … in most years since the mid-
1950s,” Sudetic and Bennett note the economy  never really prospered for any significant period of time. 
37 Sudetic, Charles in Yugoslavia: A Country Study, 47-53. 
38 Bennett, 68. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Leslie Benson, Yugoslavia, A Concise History (Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 112-114. 
41 Ibid, 114, “By 1970, a million Yugoslav citizens were working abroad, mostly in West Germany.” 
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There were short periods of success with some of the economic reforms, so much 
so that both John Lampe and Malinda K. Goodrich describe the Yugoslav economy as 
relatively prosperous from 1950 to the early 1970s.42  However, growth was uneven, 
prosperity was concentrated mostly in Croatia and Slovenia, Yugoslav guest workers in 
Western Europe provided hard currency for the country’s economy, and Western, 
especially U.S., aid was generous after the break with the Soviet Union.43  During 
various periods from 1948 to 1990, Yugoslavia would be the recipient of U.S. loans and 
grants.  Much of this assistance was directly aimed at countering the Yugoslav-Soviet 
relationship.44  Yugoslavia was able to take advantage of the Cold War tension between 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union to obtain American loans, which boosted the country’s 
economy.  In the end, Yugoslavia’s economy represented another failed attempt at 
socialism, with similar results as the economies of the nations in the Soviet bloc. 
Tito’s death on 4 May 1980 marked the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia.45  He 
left Yugoslavia with a constitutional arrangement that soon brought government 
functioning to a halt. Also, ethnic tensions, which he had chosen not to confront openly, 
erupted freely in his absence. Moreover, Yugoslavia’s economy was on the verge of 
collapse.  Although some leaders in positions of power hoped to preserve Yugoslavia and 
continue what has been termed the “Yugoslav experiment,” there were enough non-
supporters or outright opponents to eventually make that impossible. 
B. POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA, 1980-2000 
1. Introduction 
With Tito gone, the opponents of the system he put into place could now come 
forward and promote their views.  There was internal opposition to Tito’s economic, 
political and nationalities policies.  The opposition to his nationalities policies would do 
the most harm.  Some of Yugoslavia’s political elite wanted to liberalize the economy 
and democratize and simplify the political system. However, another group sought to 
 
42 See Lampe, also Goodrich in Yugoslavia: A Country Study. 
43 Bennett, 68-69. 
44 Lampe, 274.. 
45 Bennett, 74.  Bennett writes “The unifying bonds which tied the country together were Tito himself, the armed 
forces, which Tito had created and still dominated, and the LCY, which Tito had just purged.  At a time when he was 
already in his eighties and could not expect to live much longer, he had made himself more indispensable to Yugoslavia 
than he had ever been before.” 
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change the nationalities policy to allow the Serbs to dominate and repress minority 
groups, Albanians in particular.   
Prior to 1945, Yugoslavia was a Serb-dominated entity.  During the time of the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, a royal line of Serbian princes ruled the country.  
Later, when a parliamentary system existed briefly, Serbs still tended to dominate.  All of 
that had changed under Tito.  He genuinely wanted to create a Yugoslavia in which all 
were equal and no single national group dominated.  This policy can be seen in his 
attempt to bring the Albanians of Kosovo into the Yugoslav mainstream and his 
willingness to crush Croat nationalism, although he was half Croat.  Tito kept ethnic and 
national divisions from dividing and destroying Yugoslavia. 
This section examines the two issues facing Yugoslavia in the 20 years after 
Tito’s death.  The first issue was Yugoslavia’s worsening economic troubles.  The second 
problem was growing ethnic and nationalist tensions.  These two onerous challenges led 
to the wars that eventually broke Yugoslavia apart. 
2. A Difficult Decade, 1980 to 1990 
The foreign loans that began pouring into Yugoslavia after the break with the 
Soviet Union became an easy source of funding for a struggling Yugoslav economy.  By 
1982, the country’s foreign debt had reached the unsupportable total of $20 billion.46  
Yugoslavia’s borrowing was out of control with the total debt representing money 
borrowed by the federal government, republican governments, banks and private 
businesses.47  Both Bennett and Lampe write about the lack of control the federal 
government had over this borrowing and its shock once the depth of the debt was 
discovered.48  An exhaustive explanation of the depth and causes of the economic crisis 
are beyond the scope of this study, however, what is important to note is that 
economically Yugoslavia was in an untenable situation.49  The irony of the situation was 
the annual 5.1 percent “growth” in GDP per capita reported for 1970 to 79 was made 
 
46 Lampe, 322. 
47 Ibid, also see Bennett, 70. 
48 Lampe, 322, Bennett, p. 70. 
49 See Lampe’s Yugoslavia as History for an in-depth explanation of the nuances of Yugoslavia’s economic 
troubles. 
17 
                                                
possible only by the growing foreign debt.50  Just two years after Tito’s death, the 
Yugoslav economy was in need of serious restructuring.  No amount of budget cutting 
could help to repay the foreign debt.  The cost of living and inflation also rose during this 
period.51
The U.S. was in the forefront of the effort to provide Yugoslavia with debt relief 
and an escape from economic troubles.  Private banks and the U.S. government provided 
loans and a debt-relief package designed to assist the country in paying the interest on its 
national debt.  Other contributors included the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank, and The Bank for International Settlements.52  Yugoslavia’s first prime 
minister (the chair of the Federal Executive Council), Milka Planinc, was the architect 
behind these aid packages.  Planinc was succeeded by Branko Mikulic, a Bosnian Croat, 
who found himself unable to take the next steps in reforming the economy of the 
federation due to opposition by hard-line communists.  In the end, those who wanted to 
stop the move away from socialism derailed the efforts of the chair of the Federal 
Executive Council to reform the economy, take austerity measures, and enlist the support 
of international donors and monetary organizations. 
The country’s economic troubles, although not the sole cause of the increasing 
nationalism and ethnic divisions, was one factor that fed them.  The ethnic upheavals of 
the 1980s began with protests in Kosovo.  The first major protest took place in March 
1981 and began as a spontaneous rally by students at Pristina University who were 
displeased with the service in the cafeteria.  Prolonged wait times for meal services drove 
the students into the streets.53  Unfortunately, the protests were hijacked by those with 
nationalist political agendas and approximately two weeks after the protests had begun, 
the students were demanding a republic.54  Eventually, the protests were squelched by 
force, many Albanians were jailed, and severe police repression became a way of life for 
the Albanians in Kosovo. 
 
50 Lampe, 322, during the same period the “foreign debt (grew) by fully 20 percent a year.” 
51 Lampe, 322. 
52 Ibid, 326. 
53 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, (New Haven and London Yale University Press, 2002), 38-39. 
54 Ibid, 39. 
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At the time that Kosovo and Vojvodina were granted extensive autonomy and 
equality by the 1974 constitution, many Serbians were angered at the development; 
however, they feared Tito and the response that any overt show of nationalism would 
garner, Serbs kept their displeasure to themselves until after Tito’s death.  Freed from the 
threat of punishment after 1980, Serbs could attempt to take steps to reverse the 
constitutional developments.  The first hint of future developments was the 1986 
Memorandum, a document produced by “sixteen prominent academics, including 
economists, scientists, historians and philosophers.”55  The group was assembled by 
Dobrica Cosic, a Serbian novelist, former Partisan, and friend of Tito, who was purged 
from the communist party in 1968 for expressing anti-Albanian sentiments.56  A 
newspaper published a draft of the document in an attempt to discredit it.  Instead its 
appearance in the newspaper gave this vicious expression of Serbian neo-nationalism 
wide exposure in Yugoslavia.57   
About the same time the Memorandum was stirring up ethnic tensions, Slobodan 
Milosevic, an increasingly prominent member of the Serbian communist party, emerged 
as the political leader of Serbia.  This development had many catastrophic effects.  First, 
although he initially condemned the Memorandum, Milosevic eventually assumed the 
mantle of protector of Serbian national interests.58  Second, he awakened fears in the 
other republics of a return to Serbian dominance and how that dominance might be 
imposed.  The other republics came to see Kosovo as a harbinger of what was in store for 
them.  Again, Judah writing about Milosevic: 
Once he had achieved his aim of abolishing provincial autonomy, he came 
to believe he could dominate the rest of Yugoslavia.  The problem was 
that the very act of abolishing the provinces’ autonomy, and the fact that 
the federal police and army–i.e., men from all the other republics–were 
now involved in suppressing violent demonstrations across Kosovo, was 
setting the stage for disintegration of the country as a whole.59
 
55 Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 48. 
56 Bennett, 80. 
57 Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 48. 
58 According to Tim Judah, Milosevic’s dramatic shift into the nationalist camp shifted “the political debate from 
ideology to the Serbian ‘national interest’-above all other issues-Milosevic and his allies ‘destroyed the prospects of 
Serbia’s transition to democracy.’” 
59 Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 57. 
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Significantly, just as the other republics were about to take their first steps toward a 
multi-party, democratic system, Milosevic was taking the republics of Serbia and 
Montenegro in a nationalist direction.  The desire for more autonomy within the 
federation or for outright secession from the federation, a desire which was festering in 
Croatia and Slovenia, understandably grew.  Later, when Milosevic came to realize that 
he could not dominate the other republics or prevent their secession from the central 
Yugoslav state, he was satisfied with fighting for the territory of the other republics 
where a majority of Serbs either lived or once lived. 
4. Conclusion 
The emergence of Slobodan Milosevic, from 1986 to 1989, as the major political 
force in the Serbian republic had tremendous repercussions for the Yugoslav federation.  
The ill-effects of his reign will be experienced for many more years in Serbia.  If Silber 
and Little were correct, Yugoslavia was ahead of most Eastern European countries in its 
readiness to reform and to join the democratic nations of Europe.60  Yet, in Milosevic’s 
hands, similar political and economic problems to those experienced by such countries as 
Poland and Czechoslovakia were magnified.  Moreover, the additional problems of war, 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, organized crime and widespread corruption complicated the 
issue.  Today, Serbia is dealing with problems the depth and breadth of which the first 
Eastern European countries that gained entry into NATO and the EU did not have do deal 
with.  By forcing violent secession and civil war, by instituting a dictatorship, by going 
against world opinion and by encouraging organized crime and militias to take root, 
Milosevic took the “average” Eastern European reform problem and turned it into a 
“problem from hell” with which those interested in seeing Serbia reform must now 
contend. 
One often hears that the collapse of Yugoslavia was linked to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.  The two events occurred at the same time and were similar in that the 
main occurrence was the collapse and disintegration of a communist country.  Aside from 
those two superficial similarities, the two events were not significantly related.  The 
European events that significantly affected the collapse of the Yugoslav state were the 
destruction of the Berlin Wall and the defeat of communism in Eastern Europe.  As 
 
60 See footnote 1 and its corresponding quote. 
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Lampe writes, these events “cost Yugoslavia more than its strategic importance to the 
west.  They eliminated the legitimacy of one-party rule across Eastern Europe.”61  The 
LCY, which was halfheartedly attempting to hold Yugoslavia together, quickly found 
itself surrounded by former communist countries in which a majority of the people had 
strongly rejected communism in favor of multi-party and democratic political systems. 
C. THE YUGOSLAV SECURITY SECTOR FROM 1944 TO 2005 
The wars of secession that took place in Yugoslavia during the 1990s and the 
1999 conflict in Kosovo have been well chronicled; therefore, a detailed description is 
not necessary here.  The important aspect of these conflicts, for the purpose of our study, 
is the effect they had on the security sector in Yugoslavia, particularly the military.   
The lack of legitimate, democratic, civilian control of the military predates the 
conflicts in Yugoslavia during the 1990s.  However, during the conflicts, this lack of 
civilian control manifested itself in a disastrous way.  A majority of the individuals 
indicted and tried by The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) were members of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), including a former Chief 
of Staff of the JNA, Nebojsa Pavkovic.62   
1. The Military 
In October 2005, the state union of Serbia and Montenegro acquired its sixth 
Defense Minister since the February 2000 assassination of Defense Minister Pavle 
Bulatovic (see Table 1).  The most recent Defense Minister, Prvoslav Davinic, lasted 
from April 2004 to September 2005 in a tenure plagued by scandals.63  Along with 
instability in what should be the segment of the Ministry of Defense leading Serbia and 
Montenegro toward PfP and western integration, the Serbian military of 2005 retains 
many of the characteristics embedded into it when its nucleus was formed under the 
wartime leadership of Josip Broz Tito.  The leadership of the armed forces remains 
politicized, strictly military in leadership from top to bottom, and autonomous of true 
civilian control in the western sense of that term.  After more than forty years of being 
closed to non-party members, “symbolic and ineffectual control … by the high 
 
61 Lampe, 332. 
62 See ICTY indictments for biographies and offenses of these individuals, http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-
e.htm. 
63 http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1090998&C+europe&P=true.  Accessed 15 October 2005. 
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representative bodies of the state … and the party” and being allowed to “strictly limit the 
quantity and quality of relevant public information on defense and the military,” the 
armed forces of Serbia and Montenegro are finding it difficult to implement reform. 
The legacy of the current Serbian military was established under Tito during and 
immediately after the Second World War.  Tito set up the Yugoslav military to mirror the 
armed forces of the Soviet Union.  According to the Slovene expert Anton Bebler, the 
Yugoslav politico-military system had four important characteristics that directly 
mimicked the Soviet system.  Bebler lists them as: 
1.  The officially sanctioned monopoly within the military of the ideology 
professed by the ruling Communist Party. 
2.  The primacy of politics in the military sphere, which is maintained by 
the primacy of top civilian politicians over the professional military and 
through the primacy of political considerations within the military 
establishment. 
3.  Open and officially enforced politization (sic) of the professional 
military; and 
4.  The professional military’s integration into the political system through 
mostly obligatory membership in the ruling Communist Party.64
The result of the third characteristic was a purposeful and direct effort by the government 
and military to ensure the political reliability of professional military members.65  Tito 
appointed himself defense minister and appointed other members of the Yugoslav 
Communist Party to the top civilian posts in the military.66  In the 1960s this practice of 
putting civilian party members into the top military positions was phased out and high 
ranking military officers began filling what were ostensibly civilian positions.67  So the 
“minister of defense, deputy ministers and assistants … since 1967 have been a 
professional general who received military and general college-level and graduate 
 
64 Anton Bebler, “Political Pluralism and the Yugoslav Professional Military,” in The Tragedy of Yugoslavia: The 
Failure of Democratic Transition, Jim Seroka and Vukasin Pavlovic, eds. (New York and London, England: M.E. 
Sharpe Armonk, 1992), 108. 
65 Bebler gives a detailed description of the methods used for politicizing military members on pages 108-109. 
66 Bebler, 110. 
67 Ibid. 
22 
education in Yugoslav, Soviet, and Western military schools and academies.”68  As late 
as 1992, the leadership of the Yugoslav military “publicly resisted and angrily rejected” 
any attempt to place civilians in these key defense ministry posts.69  The first break with 
military officers at the head of the Ministry of Defense came with the appointment of 
Milosevic crony, Pavle Bulatovic, in 1994 (see Table 1).70
 
Ministers of Defense 1945-2005 
 
Name   Dates of Tenure   Affiliation 
 
Josip Broz Tito  1945-1953 (+1980)  CPY/LCY 
Ivan Gosnjak   1953-1967 (+1984)  LCY 
Nikola Ljubicic  1967-1980   Military 
Branko Mamula  1980-1988   Military 
Veljko Kadijevic  1988-1992   Military 
Blagoje Adzic  1992 (acting)   Military 
Zivota Panic  14 Jul 1992 - 2 Mar 1993 (acting) Military 
Pavle Bulatovic  2 Mar 1993 - 7 Feb 2000 (+) DPS, SNPCG  
Dragoljub Ojdanic  7 Feb 2000 - 4 Nov 2000  Military 
Slobodan Krapovic 4 Nov 2000 - 29 Jan 2002  SNPCG 
Velimir Radojevic  29 Jan 2002 - 17 Mar 2003  SNPCG  
Boris Tadic  17 Mar 2003 - 16 Apr 2004  DS 
Prvoslav Davinic  16 Apr 2004 – Oct 2005  G17 Plus 
Zoran Stankovic  Oct 2005     
Table 1. Ministers of Defense 1945-200571 
 
Another feature of civilian control of the military under Tito was its autocratic 
and exclusive nature.  The Yugoslav Federal Assembly had no oversight powers over the 
military.  Military policy and control were Tito’s personal purview.72
The nature of the civil-military relationship in Yugoslavia into the early 1990s 
was a result of several factors outlined by Bebler.  First the post World War II Yugoslav 
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71 This table was created using information from http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/yugoslav.htm and 
http://www.terra.es/personal/mothman/fry.htm.  Accessed 19 October 2005. 
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military was characterized by strong “civilian” control of the military in the person of 
Tito.  This occurred because the “army was created by the Communist Party” and not the 
other way around, as occurred most often in guerilla movements.73  Second, beginning in 
the 1960s there was a break in the civilian control tradition and the top Ministry of 
Defense positions began to be filled by military men.  This phenomenon coupled with the 
wholesale purge in the civilian security service from 1966 to 67, which was conducted, in 
part, by the military security … further enhanced the military’s separation from the party 
and civilian security establishment.”74  The next trend was initiated by the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, which led to the abolishment of “the monopoly of 
the federal standing army” due to the emergence of a Territorial Defense Force.75   
Beginning in 1990, some in Yugoslavia began to look to the Yugoslav People’s 
Army as a means of preventing the growing separatist movements from succeeding.76  In 
early 1990’s, the JNA leadership still reflected the ethnic mix that was supposed to 
characterize Yugoslavia.  The High Command of the Yugoslav military was a 38 percent, 
33 percent, and 8.3 percent mix of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes, respectively.77  Within the 
ranks of the JNA there were individuals who harbored ethnic hatred based, not on ancient 
events, but on the violent struggle between Partisans, Ustashe and Chetniks during World 
War II.  For instance, General Ratko Mladic, the military leader of the Bosnian Serbs 
who is now an indicted war criminal, was reported to have lost his father in the fighting 
during the Second World War and to have grown up hearing stories about Ustashe 
atrocities.78  There were, however, many high ranking officers within the JNA who were 
“a throwback to the Tito era when ideological orthodoxy and fidelity to Titoism had been 
prerequisites to a military career.”79  The officers in this group are believed to have truly 
desired the continuance of Yugoslavia as Tito envisioned it. 
 
73 Ibid, 120. 
74 Bebler, 122. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Curtis, 227. 
77 Bennett, 132. 
78 Ibid, 131. 
79 Ibid, 132. 
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In addition, the Yugoslav military wanted to preserve the country because it 
would lose legitimacy if communism failed and Yugoslavia collapsed.  By the time of 
Tito’s death, the military “had been thoroughly integrated into the orderly running of the 
country and a succession mechanism was in place, in which the Yugoslav military was 
assured of continued influence.”80  The military was in partnership with the communist 
party to keep the country together.  This outlook of the military leadership was 
personified in Veljko Kadijevic, Yugoslav Defense Minister from 1988 to 1992.  To 
Kadijevic, the survival of the JNA depended on the survival of Yugoslavia.  He wanted to 
keep the country together because, “a unitary state was the sole option, since that was the 
only arrangement which would enable the JNA and defence industry to continue in its 
present form.”81  This threat to the survival of the defense establishment coupled with 
Kadijevic’s belief in a socialist Yugoslav state, resulted in a concerted effort by the 
Yugoslav military to halt the pluralist and democratic tendencies that began to erupt in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s.82
This political position made Kadijevic and the JNA susceptible to the Milosevic 
and Serbian nationalists beginning in the late 1980s.  Milosevic, with his forceful (if 
insincere) insistence on the preservation of Yugoslavia made him a natural ally for 
Kadijevic and the JNA.  Despite Kadijevic’s personal dislike of the Serbian leader, he 
became allied with Milosevic in his efforts to use military force to keep Yugoslavia 
together.83  That alliance is having long-term repercussions for what is left of the 
Yugoslav military in Serbia and Montenegro.  One feature of the JNA’s involvement in 
the conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Kosovo is a war-crimes legacy, which 
is proving difficult to overcome due to Serb nationalism and the inability of Serbs to take 
responsibility for actions taken in the name of “Greater Serbia.” 
When it became apparent that the army could not hold Yugoslavia together, 
Milosevic purged the army.  The officers who were valuable because of their 
 
80 Robin Alison Remington, “Political-Military Relations in Post-Tito Yugoslavia,” in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, 
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commitment to Yugoslavia became a liability as the country disintegrated.  In order to 
eliminate the chance that the officers loyal to a Yugoslavia that no longer existed would 
fail to transfer their loyalty to him, in 1992 and 1993 Milosevic purged all but “nine 
former JNA generals” from the newly designated Army of Yugoslavia (VJ).84
The following is an examination of three ICTY indictments chronicling activities 
by JNA/JV officers.  Although a variety of professions can be found throughout the 
ICTY indictments, including waiters, a mechanic, a dentist and assorted others, the 
majority of indictees were active-duty military forces taking part in the war as part of the 
military of the rump Yugoslav state, or as members of the military of newly declared 
independent states or regions.85
a. The Pavkovic et al. Indictment, 22 September 2003 
This indictment named Colonel Generals Nebojsa Pavkovic, Vladimir 
Lazarevic, Vlastimir Djordjevic, and Sreten Lukic who served in the JNA and/or the 
Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP).86  Each general stands accused of ethnic 
cleansing of Albanians from the Kosovo Province in 1999.  The charges not only reflect a 
lack of civilian, parliamentary oversight of the military, they also reflect a lack of a 
professional code of ethics within the military.  The charges include planning, instigating, 
ordering, committing, or aiding and abetting “a deliberate and widespread or systemic 
campaign of terror and violence directed at Kosovo Albanian civilians,”… forcibly 
expelling and internally displacing thousands of Albanians from their homes and the 
“deliberate and widespread or systematic campaign of destruction of property owned by 
Kosovo Albanian civilians.”87  Forces ultimately under the command and direction of 
these men deported Albanians from Kosovo (and therefore Serbia), engaged in the 
forcible transfer of Albanians within Kosovo, committed murders of “hundreds of 
Kosovo Albanian civilians,” and committed “political, racial, or religious” persecutions 
 
84 Timothy Edmonds, Defence Reform in Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro (New York: Oxford University Press 
for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003), 24. 
85 ICTY Indictment IT-02-65, http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mea-ci020705e.htm; ICTY Indictment 
IT-03-72, http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/bab-ii031117e.htm.  Accessed 13 November 2005. 





                                                
of Albanians.88  All four generals were decorated by the Yugoslav state for their service 
in Kosovo. 
b. The “Vukovar Hospital” Indictment against Mile Mrksic, 
Miroslav Radic, Veselin Sljivancanin, and Slavko Dokmanovic, 2 
December 1997 
The November 1991 Vukovar Hospital incident, in which approximately 
250 Croatians were taken from this hospital and executed, is one of the more well known 
of the atrocities of the Yugoslav wars of secession.  Serbian rebels in the town, the 
population of which was 44% Croatian and 37% Serb at the time that fighting broke out 
(after Croatia declared its independence), were supported militarily by the JNA.89  This 
particular indictment names four individual, three of whom, Colonel Mile Mrksic, Major 
Veselin Sljivancanin, and Captain Miroslav Radic, were members of the JNA and who, 
with the aid of Slavko Dokmanovic, the fourth man named in the indictment, were 
responsible for the execution of the Croatian villagers.  In Vukovar, as in many other 
villages and towns in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, where Serbs residents were 
fighting for territory that would later be incorporated into a “Greater Serbia” the JNA 
“intervened in support of the Serb insurgents.”90  In this particular case, the JNA 
“attacked surrounding villages inhabited mostly by non-Serbs … surrounded the city of 
Vukovar laying siege to it,” and “engaged in sustained artillery assault of the city.”91  
Again, this is a case in which not only the lack of civilian control, but a lack of 
professional military ethics, and the absence of knowledge of and or adherence to the 
rules of warfare characterized the actions of the Yugoslav armed forces.   
c. The “Lasva Valley” Indictment against Tihomir Blaskic  
This third indictment names a Croatian who was a career military officer 
in the JNA, who after the war broke out became a colonel and then a commanding 
General in the Croatian Defense Force (HVO) headquartered in Mostar, in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  Blaskic, a graduate from the Military Academy in Belgrade was indicted 
on twenty counts.  The charges against him included persecuting Bosnian Muslim 
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civilians, unlawful attacks on civilians and civilian objects, willful killing and causing 
injury, destruction and plunder of property, destruction of institutions dedicated to 
religion or education, and finally inhumane treatment, the taking of hostages, and the use 
of human shields.92
2. The State Security Service and Internal Affairs Arrangements 
Internal security forces were instrumental in establishing and maintaining 
the communist-controlled Yugoslav state after World War II.93
During World War II, Yugoslavia’s communists created the Department for 
Protection of the People (OZN), a security service tasked with finding enemies of the 
revolution.  The OZN was replaced by the Directorate for State Security (UDB) in March 
1946.94  The UDB had “unrestricted powers to arrest, imprison, and even execute 
political opponents without public trial.”95  The UDB organization contained paramilitary 
units and was mainly staffed by Serbs and Montenegrins.96  From its inception, the 
organization was trained to root out Yugoslavs disloyal or threatening to the regime.  The 
UDB became the Service for State Security (SDB) in 1966, after a purge of its leadership 
for, among other offenses, spying on Tito.97
During its lifetime, the main tasks of the UDB/SDB included uncovering pro-
Stalin “Cominformists” after the break with the Soviet Union, spying on and arresting 
internal dissidents, “identifying and neutralizing émigré organizations in foreign 
countries” who were trying to undermine the government at home, and monitoring 
Croatian organizations abroad.98  The organization has been linked to several 
assassinations of Yugoslav émigrés.99  The Council for the Protection of the 
Constitutional Order was the overriding control mechanism for all agencies involved in 
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internal security.  Beneath it were numerous agencies at the federal, republic and 
province level, including the Office of the Federal Public Prosecutor.100
In 1991, as Yugoslavia began to crumble, each republic grasped control of its 
portion of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order bureaucracy, 
Slobodan Milosevic was no exception.  He proceeded to use the renamed Serbian State 
Security Division (RDB) for operations in Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Kosovo.101
It is likely that one of the key reasons for the persistent problem of corruption and 
criminality within the judiciary in Serbia is the historical relationship between the 
Yugoslav judicial system and the internal security services.  In addition, the paramilitary 
groups that ran amok during the Yugoslav wars of succession were predated by the 
People’s Militia, a federal paramilitary force of approximately 15,000 troops, which was 
controlled by the Secretariat for Internal Affairs.102  Yugoslavia’s internal security 
system certainly contributed to the atrocities that occurred in the 1990s and persist today 
in the failure to create an independent judiciary.  As with the military, the various internal 
security forces that came into being after Yugoslavia’s division were deeply involved in 
atrocities that occurred during the wars of secession.  The following case is just one 
example of the kind of actions in which these security forces engaged. 
Stanisic and Simatovic (IT-03-69):  This indictment names Jovica Stanisic, the 
head of the State Security Service (DB) in Serbia and close friend and ally of Milosevic 
and Franko Simatovic, head of a Special Operations Unit of the DB.103  Stanisic is 
accused of authorizing and Simatovic of establishing a training center for special 
paramilitary units.  The training center produced some of the worst Serbian paramilitary 
groups, such as Arkan’s Tigers, the Red Berets and Martic’s Police that operated in 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.104  These units were “deployed” to locations in Croatia 
and BiH where they were subordinated to Croatian Serb and Bosnian Serb militias.  
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Stanisic and Simatovic had the ultimate responsibility for directing, organizing, training, 
supplying, arming, and financing these groups.105  Stanisic and Simatovic were charged 
with persecution, murder, and deportation and forcible transfers of non-Serbs from 
contested areas in Croatia and BiH.106  Stanisic was considered “the most powerful man 
in Serbia apart from Slobodan Milosevic.”107  He took part in criminal operation on 
behalf of the Yugoslav state as Head of the DB from 1991 to 1998.  The indictment of 
Stanisic and Simatovic details how the Yugoslav security services directed and 
committed war crimes in two neighboring states as part of a plan that came from the very 
top of the Yugoslav government. 
3. Conclusion 
The critical need for security sector reform in Serbia in 2005 was created by the 
communist legacy of Yugoslavia and the criminal legacy of Slobodan Milosevic’s rule 
during the 1990s.  The Serbian military must overcome the traditional problems of post-
communist militaries in countries whose economy were ravaged by socialism.  Such 
problems as outdated weapons, crumbling infrastructure, the need to downsize, the need 
to create effective democratic parliamentary accountability and civilian control, and the 
need to depoliticize the officer corps are only the beginning of the issues that must be 
addressed.  The activities of the Yugoslav military under the direction of Slobodan 
Milosevic must also be addressed.  The commission of war crimes, the alleged harboring 
of war criminals, and the criminality and scandal that still plagues the armed forces of 
Serbia must also be assessed and corrected.  The police sector must also overcome the 
communist and criminal legacy.  The next chapter discusses Security Sector Reform 
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III. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR) 
Once Slobodan Milosevic was removed from power in October 2000, the Serbian 
security sector demanded change.  The entire realm was characterized by criminality, 
corruption, complicity in war crimes, and a lack of professionalism.  The new leaders of 
Serbia recognized the need to recover from the disasters of the recent past and bring their 
country into the European mainstream.  In addition to the reforms needed in the security 
sector, Serbia’s leaders faced such issues as “territorial unity, ethnic relations, 
restructuring their country’s deteriorated and corrupted economy,” political infighting 
and corruption, ICTY indictments, and the international occupation of Kosovo.108
At the beginning of 2001, Serbia took the initial steps to European and 
international integration.  Among other initiatives, the country reclaimed its seat in the 
UN General Assembly, invited the OSCE to establish a mission, and joined NATO’s 
South East Europe Initiative’s (SEEI) South East Europe Security Cooperation Steering 
Group (SEEGROUP).109  Membership in these organizations, as well as an expressed 
interest in future EU membership, started Serbia along the path of political, diplomatic 
and security sector reform. 
The previous chapter outlined the history of the Yugoslav/Serbian security sector.  
It established the origins of the problems seen in Serbia today.  However, as evidenced by 
the former Eastern European states that today are members of both NATO and the EU, 
Serbia can break from the past and create the democratic institutions.  Today in Serbia, 
several organizations are working to help the democratic transition in Serbia take hold 
and flourish.  One area of focus is Serbia’s security sector. 
This chapter addresses Security Sector Reform (SSR).  First, it defines SSR, as it 
pertains to Serbia.  Second, it traces the evolution of SSR in Eastern Europe.  Next, it 
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outlines and analyzes criticisms of SSR.  Fourth, it outlines the major ongoing SSR 
efforts in Serbia.  And finally, it evaluates the results of these efforts.110
A. WHAT IS SSR? 
The security sector encompasses “those statutory and non-statutory security 
services authorized to use force, civil society actors and oversight mechanisms, and non-
statutory forces that are not authorized to use force on any occasion.”111  The security 
sector includes the military and any forces that would typically fall under the Interior or 
Justice Ministry of a country.  It also includes the institutions and individuals who 
command and oversee these forces.  A security sector in need of reform will usually have 
evolved in a developmental context, a post-authoritarian context, or a post-conflict 
context.112  In the developmental context, a lack of economic maturity is the key driver 
for reform.  In the post-authoritarian context, a lack of democratic governance is the 
major obstacle to be overcome.  In the post-conflict context a unique and “specific 
security situation,” created by the effects of violent conflict must be overcome.113
The literature on reforming the security sector defines the concept in several 
ways.  For example, Heiner Hanggi defines SSR as being: 
essentially aimed at the efficient and effective provision of state and 
human security within a framework of democratic governance.114
Michael Brzoska defines it as the creation of: 
armed, uniformed forces which are functionally differentiated, 
professional forces under objective and subjective civilian control, at the 
lowest functional level of resource use.115
 
110 Credit for coining the term “security sector reform” is given to “the UK Development Minister Claire Short,” 
by David Law in “Security Sector Reform in the Euro-Atlantic Region: Unfinished Business,” in Reform and 
Reconstruction of the Security Sector, Alan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi, eds., Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2004), 22. 
111 Fitz-Gerald, Ann M., “Security Sector Reform-Streamlining National Military Forces to Respond to the 
Wider Security Needs,” Journal of Security Sector Management, Volume 1, Number 1, March 2003, (Shriveham UK: 
Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, Cranfield University), 4.  See also Jane Chanaa’s definition in 
Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects, Adelphi Paper 344, The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 2002, 7. 
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113 Ibid. 
114 Hanggi, 3. 
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And Nicole Ball, an established SSR expert, considers security sector reform to include 
those measures that “establish good governance in the security sector” and enhance the 
capacity of a country to reap the economic and political benefits of good governance.116   
Although SSR goals can be as narrow as civilian control of the military and 
military modernization (NATO’s requirements) and as broad as the goals of the EU’s 
Stabilization and Association Agreements, which the EU itself describes as “ambitious, 
demanding agreements, which have at their core the basic principles which underpin 
membership of the Union.”  In general, they are aimed at establishing the national 
capacity to control and to govern the sectors of the nation legally authorized to use force 
to carry out their duties.117
Security sector reform not only involves turning bad into good, such as 
democratizing a security sector formerly under communist rule.  It also makes a security 
sector that is considered good even better.  Good examples of this are the ongoing 
security sector transformation efforts in the US Department of Defense (DoD) and 
NATO.  Other examples of security sector reform are the efforts of NATO, during the 
Cold War, to make the military contributions of its members more effective and efficient 
in order to assign the security burden in a fairer manner.118
B. THE EVOLUTION OF SSR IN EUROPE 
During the Cold War, outside involvement in the security sector, in particular the 
military, of the smaller nations of the world was divided along an East-West axis.119  The 
only concern for the two main protagonists during the Cold War was to line up as many 
allies as possible and arming them so that they would be of use militarily if the need 
arose.  The effort by the Western powers to support nations outside of the alliance to 
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reform their security sector in a positive, non conflict-centered manner did not occur until 
the Cold War ended. 
After the demise of communism, many of Europe’s central and eastern countries 
expressed a desire to join the ranks of Europe’s prosperous, democratic nations.  Their 
main goal was eventual inclusion in NATO and the EU.  Once expansion was adopted as 
a desirable goal for NATO and the EU, both organizations were forced to establish 
accession requirements.  NATO’s accession requirements were articulated in the 
Membership Action Plan (MAP).120  The EU’s accession criteria were established at the 
June 1993 Copenhagen European Council in Denmark.121  NATO and EU membership 
would eventually require what would come to be defined as Security Sector Reform 
(SSR).122
The initial support and enthusiasm for reforming the security sector in the former 
communist countries came from within those countries.  Long before NATO had come to 
a consensus on enlargement, such countries as Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland had 
already begun efforts to eradicate the vestiges of communism and authoritarianism from 
their militaries and police forces.123  Once the Central and Eastern European countries 
decided that they wanted membership in NATO and the EU, they began the necessary 
steps to achieve this goal.124  Although the western nations provided guidance and 
advice, it was not under the guise of security sector reform as we know it today.  The 
main focus of reform was the lack of historical democratic values in the countries 
expressing a desire to join western institutions and the need to “recreate” the government 
 
120 The MAP was launched in April 1999 at the Alliance’s Washington Summit to help countries aspiring to 
NATO membership in their preparations.”  The MAP was based on the experiences of the first three Eastern European 
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(2001), 41-67.  For the specifics of the Czechoslovak and later Czech and Slovak cases see Jeffrey Simon, NATO and 
the Czech and Slovak Republics (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004) 
124 Reiter argues that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic “had made long strides toward democracy even 
before the NATO carrot was dangled before them.”  He also credits these countries with originating the concept of 
“NATO enlargement.” 
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bureaucracy in a western, democratic image.  In order to accede into NATO and the EU 
the aspirants were required to adopt the institutional values and practices of these 
organizations.125  For NATO, the main concern after democratic reform was 
interoperability and the capabilities the new members would bring to the alliance.  For 
the EU, it was the ability of aspirant countries to integrate economically into the union. 
The requirements of NATO and the EU along with the goals of donor institutions 
and world bodies created a powerful group of actors with a vested interest in developing 
a successful formula for reform.  Such organizations as the World Bank, the United 
Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, as well as 
individual nations such as Great Britain have invested large amounts of money in 
developing and reforming countries that fit into the three reform contexts.126  These 
donating countries and institutions want to ensure their funds are used effectively and 
efficiently.127  These different reform efforts were characterized by a realization that a 
“holistic” approach to reforming the security was necessary.  Military reform, democratic 
governance, the rule of law, police reform, judicial reform, and the creation of a strong 
civil society were all inextricably linked.  In order to have any success in one area, all 
areas had to be tackled. 
NATO launched its Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative in January 1994.128  
Although PfP’s “main task is to increase the participants’ ability to act in concert,” 
membership in the Partnership and the possibility of eventual NATO membership is 
firmly rooted in the adoption on the values of the alliance that are built upon democratic 
principles.  The MAP program was established in 1999 and was based on the lessons 
learned and growing pains experienced as a result of the first round of NATO 
enlargement.129
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The EU put its enlargement requirements on paper in 1993 in the form of the 
Copenhagen Criteria.  The first requirement for membership articulated by the criteria is 
“stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities.”130  EU membership requirements emphasize the 
need for aspirant countries to adopt a wide spectrum of “European” values including 
“political, economic, and monetary” obligations.131
As the EU and NATO were developing the processes and procedures necessary to 
integrate new members, the academic community and policy makers within donor 
organizations offered a body of analysis on reform efforts.  The Geneva Center for 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Bonn International Center for 
Conversion (BICC) are two examples of institutions that came about as a result of the 
democratizing effort in Central and Eastern Europe.132  Some existing institutes, such as 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which was founded in 1958, quickly 
turned their attention to the security related issues emanating from the former communist 
countries in Europe.  As members of think-tanks and institutes and also as individual 
researchers, many academics focused their research effort on the unique events 
happening in the former communist countries. 
Individual countries also joined the effort to provide the former communist 
countries with monetary assistance, education and guidance in their efforts.  Great 
Britain, the United States, Germany and Norway, just to name a few, quickly allocated 
money to assist in reforming the governments and economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe and to bring these countries firmly and permanently into the western camp. 
Jeffrey Simon, Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Nicole Ball, Michael Brzoska and 
many other scholars have published extensively on military reform, NATO enlargement, 
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the democratizing of communist militaries, security sector reform, and the military, 
political, economic, and organizational aspects of democratic reform. 
SSR in Europe was driven by two realities.  First, it was driven by the desire of 
former communist countries to attain membership in a powerful military alliance and a 
prosperous political and economic bloc.  Second, it was controlled by the ability of 
NATO and the EU to be selective and demanding in their entry requirements.  Without 
these two stimuli the enforcement of SSR programs and requirements would be 
ineffective.  The enthusiasm of the western governments to destroy the Soviet bloc 
permanently and the interest of academics in this unforeseen and extraordinary event 
helped to nurture the growth in SSR efforts and literature since the early 1990s.  Though 
it would be difficult to find anyone critical of the goals of SSR, some academics are 
critical of the efforts and results achieved by its practitioners.  Current criticisms on the 
development and effectiveness of SSR are the subjects of the next section. 
C. SSR AND ITS CRITICS 
Within the literature on SSR, it is not difficult to find critics—not of SSR itself— 
but of how the process has, so far, been approached and conducted.  Marina Caparini, a 
Canadian Senior Fellow at the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces (DCAF), an organization whose “mission is to promote the reform and democratic 
governance of the security sector in those states which are in need of it,” 133 has this 
criticism of SSR efforts in the Balkans: 
Security sector reform in the Western Balkans then, is not so much the 
consensual product of a rational process of self evaluation by national 
political elites as it is an instrument to serve the interests of external actors 
and agendas.134
Michael Brzoska and Andreas Heinemann-Gruder, the Head of the Research Department 
and a Senior Research Associate, respectively, at The Bonn International Center for 
Conversion (BICC) a research center that “facilitates the process whereby people, skills, 
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technology, equipment, and financial and economic resources are shifted away from the 
defense sector and applied to alternate civilian uses write:”135
For the time being, the security sector reform debate is marked by a 
mismatch between a long list of general recommendations of what could 
and should be done and concrete suggestions based on a thorough analysis 
of the problems in a particular post-conflict situation.  This might be one 
reason why country specific accounts often show little progress in security 
sector reconstruction and reform on the ground.  Security sector reform 
needs to be made concrete with respect to priorities and sequences, partial 
objectives and instruments, to have relevance in particular settings.136
Finally, from a paper on SSR written by Dr. Jane Chanaa while a Research Associate at 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies: 
The SSR agenda is therefore a simultaneously compelling and challenging 
enterprise.  This is reflected in both its popularity and track record to date.  
SSR is a much-used phrase … everyone is interested in, or at least 
promoting, SSR.  The confidence with which the objectives of the SSR 
agenda are proclaimed contrasts however with the rather limited nature of 
reform successes so far.137
These criticisms of SSR do not reflect any objection to the concept.  What they 
represent are observations of how fragmented the international SSR effort has become.  
With different organizations having different agendas, all related to SSR at work in the 
countries in need of reform, the reform effort may well be limited and lack concreteness. 
The World Bank, NATO, the EU, THE UNDP, and OSCE, although they are all 
working toward improving conditions in donor countries, have different outcome 
priorities.  For example, although the NATO Partnership for Peace invitation expresses 
the Alliance’s commitment to the “democratic principles that underpin our Alliance,” the 
overall purpose of the alliance is military in nature and the emphasis is on military 
capability.138  According to Dan Reiter, this is evidenced by NATO’s failure to sanction 
Turkey for democratic reversals in 1960, 1971, and 1980, and Greece, for a military coup 
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in 1967 and also by the fact that NATO allowed membership for authoritarian Portugal 
when the alliance was founded after World War II.  An argument against the issues raised 
by these different outcome priorities might be that SSR, whether aimed at economic 
growth, human rights, or military effectiveness, is still an effort to overcome obstacles to 
the democratic and efficient functioning of the target nation.  The efforts of the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund are concentrated on correcting security sector 
issues that have a direct impact on economic development.  In the end, any successful 
reform effort will positively affect more than one area of emphasis; however, a diffusion 
of funds and efforts in different directions may prolong the work required to attain 
success in any one area. 
D. SSR AT WORK IN SERBIA 
Whether the policy of using engagement with and the option of accession 
to NATO and EU as an incentive for SSR-related transformation will 
work in the Western Balkans remains to be seen.  It will most certainly 
turn out to be more complex, time-consuming and resource-intensive 
process given the post-conflict setting that inhibits SSR in the sub-
region.139
The South East Europe Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security 
Challenges and Opportunities postulates the belief that a combined effort by all nations 
and organizations interested in Stability in South East Europe is the only avenue to 
success in this effort.140  As the nations of South East Europe work with the numerous 
organizations trying to affect change in the region, they slowly approach NATO and EU 
standards of behavior in the security sector.   Serbia and Montenegro does not lack for 
assistance in its effort to bring about police reform.  From the time of Milosevic’s ouster 
in October 2000, to the present day, several organizations, both governmental and non-
governmental alike, have taken part in programs to assist and encourage SSR in the 
region and the state union.  What follows is an overview of the five main organizations 
working in Serbia and Montenegro to bring about reform and integration within the 
Western and European community of states. 
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Hungary, May 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2001/0105-bdp/d010530b.htm.  Accesses 24 October 2005. 
40 
                                                
1. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)141
The OSCE mission in Yugoslavia was established on 11 Jan 2001.  The 
involvement of the OSCE in Yugoslavia was just a small part of the process of 
international recognition of what was left of the former Yugoslavia after the wars of 
succession and the fall of Milosevic on 5 Oct 2000.  During the wars Yugoslavia had 
been identified as a pariah state, had lost its seat in the United Nations, and did not have 
diplomatic relations with many nations and international organizations.  The OSCE as 
well as other organizations, such as the UN, EU and Council of Europe, established or 
reestablished diplomatic relations with what remained of Yugoslavia.   
The mission was established to assist with democratization, human rights, and 
minority rights issues and creating a free media. It came at the invitation of FRY 
government.  In 2003, after the EU led negotiations, which resulted in the state union of 
Serbia and Montenegro, the OSCE mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 
became the OSCE mission to Serbia and Montenegro.  The mandate was to provide 
assistance and expertise to authorities at all levels as well as to interested individuals, 
groups and organizations in the fields of democratization, protection of human rights and, 
because of the particular situation in Serbia and Montenegro, issues having to do with the 
rights of national minorities.  More specifically, in the area of democratization, the 
mission was to help with legislation to implement democratization and human rights, to 
monitor the progress of the legislation and institutions created in the democratic reform 
effort to assist in restructuring the police and court system, and to train law enforcement 
officials and members of the judiciary. 
In the area of the rule of law and human rights the mission addresses several areas 
that, although they may not directly address SSR, will have residual affects on the 
security sector.  Those areas are reforming the judiciary, domestic war crimes trials, 
prison reform, human rights institutions, and anti-corruption activities.  Reform in any or 
all of these areas will undoubtedly force reform of law enforcement structures and 
procedures. 
 
141 All OSCE data obtained from, http://www.osce.org/sam/.  Accessed 9 October 2005. 
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The OSCE mission in Serbia and Montenegro also undertakes security building 
activities.  The activities encompass destruction of small arms, the integration of Serbia 
and Montenegro into the OSCE communications network, and assistance in 
implementing the Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures. 
Police reform is the main goal of the law enforcement department of the OSCE 
mission to Serbia and Montenegro.  There have been six “priority areas” identified that 
attest to the nature of the problems in Serbia and Montenegro.  The six areas are “police 
education and development, accountability and internal control, organized crime, 
forensics, border policing and community policing.”142  So far the mission has put a 
program in place to train multi-ethnic police forces.  Properly trained and educated multi-
ethnic police forces will greatly alleviate the human-rights and policing problems and 
may also help in narrowing the ethnic divide in Serbia and Montenegro.  There are also 
programs to provide advanced police training and prison-staff training. 
In addition, the OSCE has focused on “democratic control of the armed forces and 
security sector.”143  The OSCE mission in Serbia and Montenegro has made 
parliamentary institution building the main focus of the defense-reform effort. The OSCE 
program “is designed to assist in strengthening institutional and human capacities of the 
parliaments of the State Union and its member States, Serbia and Montenegro … The 
programme pays special attention to the role of Parliament in European Integration and to 
parliamentary oversight of the Armed Forces.”144  The premise of this approach is the 
belief that parliamentary oversight is one of the key components of SSR.  Even if the 
police and armed forces are reformed, if the parliament is unwilling or unable to establish 
and maintain oversight, the reform is incomplete and cannot be considered fully 
successful. 
 
142 OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro website, http://www.osce.org/sam/.  Accessed 9 October 2005. 
143 OSCE paper titled, “OSCE Role in Security Sector Reform – The Region of South Eastern Europe,” 
presented by Dr. Vladimir Bilandzic at the Security Sector Reform and the Media Regional Conference on Defense and 
the Freedom of Information, November 14/15 in Belgrade, Serbia & Montenegro. 
144 Democratization page of OSCE in Serbia and Montenegro website, http://www.osce.org/sam/.  Accessed 9 
October 2005. 
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An additional effort at stability and reform in Southeastern Europe, which falls 
under the OSCE, is the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, which was launched in 
Cologne, Germany on 10 June 1999.145   
2. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
NATO is involved in Serbia and Montenegro through the South East Europe 
Initiative (SEEI) with an eye to eventual membership for the country in Partnership for 
Peace.  The SEEI “is a series of programmes and initiatives aimed at promoting regional 
cooperation and long-term stability in the Balkans.”146  NATO envisions the initiative, 
which was launched at the April 1999 Washington Summit, working to bring “trust, 
stability and prosperity” to the region.147  The SEEI has been tied to PfP through the 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership (EAPC), something that will ensure that the two programs are 
working in concert to foster security sector reform in Serbia and Montenegro. 
NATO designed the SEEI to encourage participating countries to take the 
initiative in making the most of what is offered to them.  Therefore, “an important 
characteristic of the Initiative has been that initiatives and programmes would be 
conducted under regional leadership and ownership with NATO’s political and expert 
support.”148  NATO aims to provide the tools, allowing the SEEI countries to decide 
which they will use.  A good example of this is the May 2001 South East Europe 
Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities 
(SEECAP): 
The SEECAP was originally a NATO recommendation and was advanced and 
developed by countries of the region.  It is a comprehensive overview of the security 
environment in Southeastern Europe that sets out common perceptions of the challenges 
as well as opportunities for participating countries to cooperate in addressing them.  The 
document is action oriented with a robust follow-up section, and forms a basis for 
security-sector reform in the region.149
 
145 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Cologne 10 June 1999, http://www.monde-
diplomatique.fr/cahier/kosovo/ue100699-en.  Accessed 13 October 2005. 
146 NATO Fact Sheets, South East Europe Initiative. 
147 Ibid, comments by then NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson. 
148 Ibid, italics added. 
149 Ibid. 
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Serbia and Montenegro is also a member of the South East Europe Security 
Cooperation Steering Group (SEEGROUP), which “support(s) the various cooperative 
processes already at work in the region.”150   
The SEEI works to coordinate and to consolidate the various SSR efforts in the 
region in order to generate meaningful change.  There are numerous programs in the 
region and the danger exists that each separate endeavor will work at cross purposes to 
the others.  If the SEEI is successful, NATO will be able to effect reform in the region 
without bearing an inordinate amount of the financial burden for reform.  At the same 
time the Alliance maintains a presence in the region and serves as a constant reminder of 
the goal of reform to countries like Serbia and Montenegro. 
3. The European Union (EU) 
The prospect of EU enlargement came about as a result of the democratic 
revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989.151  The Copenhagen Criteria, 
announced at the 1993 European Council meeting in Copenhagen, established the 
requirements for EU enlargement, namely: 
• stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy,  
• the rule of law, 
• human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, 
• the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, 
• the ability to take on the obligations of membership including an 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.   
In 1995 in Madrid, the European Council added the requirement that all EU 
legislation be “transposed” into national legislation and the appropriate judicial and 
legislative structures possess the capacity to enforce the legislation.152  All countries 
 
150 NATO Fact Sheets, South East Europe Initiative. 
151 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/index_en.htm, EU Enlargement: A Historic Opportunity, Europa, 
Gateway to the European Union website.  Accessed 16 April 2005. 
152 Ibid. 
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wishing to join the union after this time bore the burden of complying with all of these 
requirements.  As an EU aspirant, Serbia must reform itself to meet these requirements.  
Between May 1999 and November 2000, the EU developed a plan it hoped would 
encourage the countries of the Western Balkans (Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, and Macedonia) to make a concerted effort to reform 
themselves and draw closer to EU member countries.153  EU officials hope this plan, the 
Stabilization and Association process, will give these five countries both the incentive 
(eventual EU accession) and the means (guidance and limited economic assistance) to 
bring lasting peace and stability to the region, which now, because of the accession of 
Slovakia and Hungary, borders the EU both to the north and south, with a possible border 
to the east in 2007 with the probable accession of candidate countries Romania and 
Bulgaria. 
The Stabilization and Association Agreement requires the countries in the 
Western Balkans to have “respect for democratic principles, human rights and the rule of 
law.”154  The First Annual report on the Stabilization and Association notes the “critical 
weaknesses in the rule of law and democratic institutions, endemic corruption, the threat 
of resurgence of extreme forms of nationalism, as well as poverty and social exclusion, 
[which] all pose a serious threat.”155  The report also predicts that, “This is an enterprise 
which will demand many years of political and economic investment.”156
E. SSR OUTCOMES IN SERBIA FROM 2001-2005 
In October 2000, Slobodan Milosevic was defeated at the polls in an election 
whose outcome he had no intention of respecting.  After two days of protests in the 
streets of Belgrade, Milosevic was forced to concede victory to Vojislav Kostunica, the 
candidate put forward by the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS).  DOS was a 
conglomeration of seventeen parties that had tried for many years to unite in an effort to 
defeat Milosevic.  Political infighting, differences on major issues, and personality 
 
153 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/actions/sap.htm, Europa, Gateway to the European Union 
website.  Accessed 16 April 2005. 
154 Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission, The Stabilization and Association 




                                                
conflicts had prevented the DOS from presenting a united front and a united vision to the 
people of Serbia.  As a result, Milosevic maintained power until 2000, even though there 
had been street protests against him as early as 1996.  In 2000, as a result of the NATO 
bombing and subsequent “loss” of Kosovo, the DOS was able to unite long enough to 
defeat Milosevic at the polls. 
After Milosevic’s political defeat and removal from power, the European Union 
rushed in with 200 million euros in non-conditional aid to Serbia.157  The aid was aimed 
at helping Serbia survive the winter of 2000-2001, something made difficult as a result of 
the devastation of years of international sanctions and the March to June 1999 NATO 
bombing campaign. 
The DOS coalition did not last long and Milosevic’s June 2001 transfer to The 
Hague shattered the fragile coalition.  Zoran Djindjic, Serbia’s reform-minded Prime 
Minister directed Milosevic’s arrest and transfer, something Kostunica, a “moderate 
nationalist” had always vowed not to allow.  The personal battle between these two 
leaders within the DOS erupted into open hostility and would remain so until the 
assassination of Djindjic in March 2003. 
Against this unstable political backdrop, security sector reform was not possible 
and still remains a difficult program to implement.  Serbia, as part of the State Union of 
Serbia and Montenegro, but mainly on its own has been struggling to reform its military 
and to achieving its stated goal of membership in Partnership for Peace since 2001.  Since 
the ouster of Slobodan Milosevic, reform-minded politicians in Serbia have pursued PfP 
membership. 
1. Defense Reform 
In 2001, military reform was not a government or military priority of Serbia.  This 
is understandable considering that in 2001, Yugoslavia was in the process of recovering 
from the effects of Slobodan Milosevic’s rule.  Several key proposals were made in 2001 
that indicated a desire to implement reform.  They were the adoption of a measure to 
reduce the service commitment of conscripts, the dismantling or incorporation of former 
criminal para-military units into Serbia’s security structures, the announcement of “a 
 
157 BBC News Online, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/970931.stm.  Accessed 29 November 2005. 
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major restructuring of the armed forces” and the initiation of Army trials for service 
members suspected of war crimes in Kosovo. However the overall reform effort was 
characterized by inactivity and there was “very little substantial change in FRY security 
thinking.158
Serbia did not make much progress on reforms in 2002.159  The main obstacle to 
reform continued to be mostly political in nature.  The battle for political supremacy and 
control of Serbia’s future between the two main democratic political parties, the 
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and the Democratic Party (DS), prevented meaningful 
improvements in all areas.  Key events in 2002 included a furor over arm sales to Iraq by 
the Serbian Army and the arrest and beating of American diplomat John Neighbor and 
Serbian Vice-President Momcilo Perisic by members of the army.160  The Serbian and 
Yugoslav governments were not informed of the arrests before they occurred.161
Even the major positive development in 2002, the removal of Chief of the General 
staff, Nebojsa Pavkovic, occurred in a controversial and perhaps illegal manner.162  
 
158 For a complete picture of 2001 reform related actions and activities see:  Commission of the European 
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Oxford Analytica, 21 June 2001; “Yugoslavia: Army Revolts against War Crimes Court,” OxResearch, Oxford 
Analytica, 21 June 2001; Kusovac, Zoran, “Belgrade’s Battle for Change, Jane’s Defence Weekly,  16 January 2002; 
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International Crisis Group Balkans Report Number 136, “Arming Saddam: The Yugoslav Connection,” 3 December 
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December 2005. 
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Stabilisation and Association Report, 26 March 2003, 10. 
162 International Crisis Group Balkans Briefing, “Fighting to Control Yugoslavia’s Military,” 15 July 2002, 
Belgrade/Brussels, 1. 
47 
                                                
During his announcement of Pavkovic’s “retirement” Yugoslav President Vojislav 
Kostunica praised Pavkovic for his performance during Serbia’s military campaign in 
Kosovo in 1999.  Pavkovic was later indicted by and extradited to The Hague for the 
committing war crimes in Kosovo. 
The following quote refers to the incident in which an American diplomat and the 
Serbian Vice-President were kidnapped and beaten, but could also be applied to the Iraq 
arms sales scandal and the overall lack of reform progress. 
The nationalist, conservative and corrupt military, which as the incident 
demonstrates is at least substantially beyond civilian control, seems intent 
on protecting important elements of the Milosevic legacy and is apparently 
now prepared to intervene more openly to influence negatively a broad 
range of policies, including the domestic reform agenda, cooperation with 
the Hague Tribunal, and relations with neighboring countries.163
In 2003 Serbian security sector reform efforts advanced significantly.164  Modest 
yet crucial accomplishments took place against the backdrop of the March 2003 
assassination of reform-minded Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic.  The appointment of DS 
member Boris Tadic to the post of Defense Minister was one reason for progress in 
defense reform.165  Tadic initiated important changes including the dismissal of 16 
general officers in an attempt to purge the military of Milosevic holdovers.166  
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Unfortunately, Tadic’s tenure as Defense Minister ended prematurely when he was 
elected as head of his party in February 2004, replacing Zoran Djindjic.167  In June 2003 
the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro formally announced its desire to join NATO’s 
PfP program.168
NATO’s Istanbul Summit was held in June 2004 and was closely watched by the 
government of Serbia and Montenegro.  After formally applying for PfP membership in 
2003, the state union expected to be admitted in 2004.  However, since NATO’s 
requirement that General Ratko Mladic’s arrest and extradition to The Hague was not 
met, Serbia and Montenegro were denied entry to PfP.  The reform journey continued to 
be slow and difficult in 2004.169
In April 2005, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro accomplished one of the 
most import aspects of initiating defense reform.  It published a “White Paper on 
Defence.”170  Formulating and publishing a national security strategy document is the 
first step in reforming or transforming defense forces.  Such a document provides those in 
charge of defense with a starting point for change.  In order to organize and to build 
forces in an efficient and effective way there must be goals to accomplish and 
requirements to meet.  The significance of the white paper does not lie in the details of 
what it says.  What is important about the white paper is that it demonstrates the Serbian 
Defense Ministry’s basic understanding of the requirements for reforming the military.  It 
“makes another reform-oriented step toward the acceptance of modern standards of 
openness and transparency in matters related to security challenges.”171  The White Paper 
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is also a notable accomplishment for a nation that has found it difficult to turn the 
assistance and advice it receives, regarding overcoming the past and adopting a new way 
of operating, into concrete actions.  The white paper is an important achievement in 
creating not only a democratically run military, but a functional, well run state.   
Although the overall reform effort in 2005 did not advance significantly more 
than in the past several years, for the first time there are concrete signs that Serbia is 
ready to comply with the requirement placed on them by the US and EU.172  In late 2004 
and early 2005 a significant number of ICTY indictees voluntarily surrendered to Serbian 
authorities and were subsequently transferred to The Hague (see Chapter IV).  The EU 
opened Stabilization and Association Agreement talks with Serbia and Montenegro after 
many years of delays due to Serb intransigence.173
2. Police Reform 
Beginning in 2002, the European Union began publishing Stabilization and 
Association progress reports on Serbia and Montenegro (at that time still Yugoslavia) as 
well as other Western Balkan countries involved in the Stabilization and Association 
process.  Each report is a synopsis of the previous year’s events.  Although the EU 
reports do not evaluate security sector reform as a whole, they do evaluate police reform. 
In the 2002 report, the police were said to be “the most obvious illustration of the 
legacies of the previous regime.”174  The problems confronting the police in Serbia and 
Montenegro included: 
Obsolete legislation, unclear division of competencies, oversize, lack of 
civilian control, connections to organized crime and—in particular in 
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Serbia—responsibility for serious human rights violations in the past 
decade.175
The report also states, “Much remains to be done in terms of coordination, legislation and 
implementation.” 
The crux of the problem in Serbia and Montenegro, as in most other countries 
trying to overcome a non-democratic past characterized by an authoritarian government 
that misuses its military and police to keep control, is a fundamental lack of knowledge 
and legislation pertaining to the security sector.  The Serbs and Montenegrins do not 
know how to conduct law enforcement in a democratic manner in which the rule-of-law 
is the overriding operational principle. 
Thus, the initial component of police reform for the state union has been the 
writing and passing of legislation that establishes the rule of law.  In December 2001 the 
“new Federal Criminal Procedure Code” was enacted.  This law covers areas such as 
“police detention” and interrogation of suspects.”  Also, in 2001 each republic 
independently began drafting additional law enforcement legislation “to redefine the 
sector as ‘serving’ the community rather than as a ‘force’ or ‘state organ,’ a Code of 
Ethics was also undertaken in 2001.  A not-so-promising aspect of these efforts was a 
protest by the “Special Forces of Serbian State Security.”176  This reluctance to embrace 
change was also noted in a Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed 
Forces (DCAF) report from 2002 in which the author noted a “very strong loyalty to the 
‘status quo,’” which makes “change within the police much more difficult.”177  The 
author ststes that although: 
there is recognition that change is necessary and inevitable, nonetheless 
what is proposed seems quite alien and threatening to many personnel who 
deliver the service on the streets … The force is over-militarised and too 
centralised and as such incapable to adept (sic) to community policing.178
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The 2002 SAA report named a long list of “main reform issues.”  The list covers 
every key facet of law enforcement or rule of law issues and highlights the long road 
ahead.  According to the 2003 SAA report: 
In spite of genuine commitment, progress in police reform in the state has 
been limited.  This has less to do with constitutional uncertainty and more 
with the legacy of the past, coupled with the adverse effect of internal 
political disputes.  Still there has been more transparency, international 
involvement and promising signs of accountability to Parliament.  The 
painful process of depoliticisation and removal of people from the 
previous regime, as well as sanctioning of incumbent officers for abuse of 
office has begun.179
That was the case for the state union as a whole; however, the report went on to 
say “there has been little progress in police reform in Serbia.”  The main issue with law 
enforcement reform in Serbia is the failure to pass legislation necessary to begin the 
process.  Either necessary laws were not passed at all, or they were passed piecemeal, in a 
fashion that made real change impossible to implement.   
The 2004 report, the last issued by the European Union prior to beginning SAA 
talks with Serbia and Montenegro in October 2005, came on the heels of the March 2003 
assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic.  Following the assassination, the Serbian 
government instituted a state of emergency, which “while of great assistance to the 
Serbian government in combating the immediate threat posed by organized crime, 
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IV. INTEGRATION OR A CONTINUING SOURCE OF 
INSTABILITY: FURTHER ISSUES BEFORE SUCCESSFUL 
WESTERN INTEGRATION 
Serbia remains in the international spotlight because it has obstructed the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, and 
because its most powerful politicians have insisted that Kosovo remain a part of Serbia.  
At the same time, Serbia has expressed interest in joining the EU and NATO.  These 
issues are both interrelated and in conflict.  In order for Serbia to become a member of 
the EU and NATO, it must comply with international treaties and international law.  The 
Dayton Peace Accord of 1995 requires Serbian cooperation with the ICTY, and United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 requires compliance with UN decisions 
regarding the Kosovo region of Serbia.181
What are the attitudes of the Serbian people and government toward the 
legitimacy of international institutions regarding the issues of the ICTY and Kosovo?  
And how will these attitudes affect Serbia’s prospects for integration into EU and NATO 
structures?  This section examines the Serbian relationship with the ICTY by detailing 
Serbia’s past and present interaction with that body.  This section then explores Serbian 
reactions to the current UN governance of Kosovo and Kosovo’s final resolution.  
Finally, the impact of these two issues on Serbian efforts and desire to integrate fully into 
western institutions is summarized. 
A. SERBIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (ICTY) 
“My stomach turns over when I think about The Hague” – Serbian Prime 
Minister Vojislav Kostunica182
From its inception, Serbs perceived the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia in The Hague as an anti-Serbian institution and an attempt by the US 
and its western allies to punish Serbia unfairly for the wars of secession that erupted in  
181 The Dayton Peace Accords on Bosnia, signed 14 December 1995, Paris, France, UNSCR 
1244http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/dayton/daytonaccord.html accessed 5 June 2005; UNSCR 1244, 10 June 
1999, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement.  Accessed 5 June 
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Yugoslavia in 1991.183  As late as 2002, a poll of 2,200 respondents showed as much as 
80% of the Serbian population “believes the ICTY is biased” against Serbs.184  A more 
recent survey showed only 50% of the Serbian population “believed the 1995 Srebrenica 
massacre by Serb forces of more than 7,500 Muslim men and boys had happened.”185  In 
light of this number, it makes sense that “two-thirds” of the people in that same survey 
believed Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic are “innocent men.”186  Most Serbs, war 
weary and tired of the struggle of everyday life as a result of international sanctions 
levied against their country for most of the 1990s, probably do not want to take the time 
and effort to think about war crimes committed in places with which most of them are 
unfamiliar.  When one considers historical Serb nationalism and the overwhelming use of 
propaganda by those in power during the wars, it is understandable that Serbs doubt the 
fairness of the ICTY and question the Serbian responsibility for war crimes. 
Rather than serving as a way to achieve justice for the victims of war crimes and 
bring closure on a horrific chapter in recent Yugoslav history, the ICTY, in part, has 
shown the blind devotion of Serbs to the cause of “defending” Serb nationalism.  In fact, 
in Serbia (and Croatia), war-crime indictees are often dispatched to The Hague amid a 
hero’s send-off with most firmly believing the indicted war criminal is not only innocent, 
but is worthy of praise for the sacrifice being made for kin and country.187  Serbs feel that 
only by turning over these innocent victims will Serbia be able to receive the assistance 
and inclusion it very much wants from the European Union and NATO. 
Until quite recently, the Serbian government has resisted and doubted the 
legitimacy of the ICTY.188  Only those who truly believed in the need for deep and wide 
ranging reform and who accepted that atrocities had been committed by Serbian 
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authorities and military leadership in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo agreed to turn over 
indictees to The Hague.  One such person was the late Serbian Prime Minister Zoran 
Djindjic.189  Djindjic, who was genuinely interested in repairing relations with the west 
and shedding Serbia’s pariah status, was the compelling force behind Slobodan 
Milosevic’s arrest and extradition to The Hague in 2001.190  Milosevic was the first 
indictee extradited by Serbia; however, his extradition resulted in such deep divisions 
within Serbia’s government that it caused the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS)-
the coalition party, which was key in bringing about Milosevic’s downfall-to splinter into 
two factions.191  After Milosevic’s extradition and Djindjic’s subsequent assassination 
(which is believed to have been perpetrated by criminal gangs on behalf of those opposed 
to the Milosevic extradition and to government reform), the Serbian government, led by 
Vojislav Kostunica, clearly would not arrest and extradite Hague indictees.192
The Stabilization and Association Reports published by the Commission of the 
European Communities blatantly revealed Serbia’s lack of cooperation with the ICTY.  
In its initial report on the progress of the Stabilization and Association process (SAp) 
within Serbia, the commission characterized Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY as 
“insufficient” and stated there was “a lack of real cooperation and even obstruction at 
[the] federal level.”193  The report also noted the “ICTY has publicly criticized the 
federal army for continuing to harbor known indictees, particularly Ratko Mladic.”194  
The 2003 report stated that cooperation with the ICTY “remains slow, reluctant and 
insufficient.”195  The report also noted this was a “serious problem,” which was 
detrimentally affecting Serbia’s efforts to gain entrance into international 
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organizations.196  The 2004 report accused Serbia of “failing to comply with its 
international obligations concerning cooperation with The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.”197  The claims made about Serbia’s ICTY 
cooperation in these reports are all based on reports by the Chief Prosecutor of the 
tribunal.  As recently as 23 November 2004, Carla Del Ponte, the Chief Prosecutor, 
reported to the Security Council that “Serbia’s lack of cooperation with the tribunal is 
‘the single most important obstacle’ to the tribunal completing its work by 2008.”198
December 2004 marked a turnaround in Serbia’s “cooperation” with the ICTY.199  
Beginning that month and continuing to the present, several Serbian and Bosnian Serb 
Hague indictees began to “voluntarily” turn themselves in for transfer to The Hague.  In 
some cases, the indictees were faced with the choice of arrest or voluntary surrender.200  
On 29 April, the BBC reported a total of 25 Hague suspects had surrendered or been 
arrested between October 2004 and April 2005.201  According to Carla Del Ponte, the 
tribunal’s current prosecutor, there are now ten remaining indictees whom the tribunal 
feels it must try before its mandate expires.  Most of these remaining suspects are Serbs 
or Bosnian Serbs.202   
The two most wanted Hague indictees to remain at large are Dr. Radovan 
Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, two Bosnian Serbs who were the “leader” and 
military commander, respectively, of the Bosnian Serb entity, which declared 
independence from Bosnia-Herzegovina and engaged in a horrific civil war in the early 
1990s.  Although both men are Serbs from Bosnia, they were supported and at times 
controlled by Slobodan Milosevic.  Both men have been evading capture and extradition 
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to The Hague since 1995.  The responsibility for transferring these men, although they 
are Bosnian Serbs, has been placed on Belgrade.   
In a 5 May 2005 article for RFE/RFL, Patrick Moore writes that “‘Europe’ is a 
word with connotations that border on magic in Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Kosova, 
Montenegro, and Serbia.”203  It is the magic in these words which has, in part, inspired 
the Serbian government to begin cooperating with the ICTY at last.  Life in Serbia has 
been difficult since the 1990s.  Serbia’s revenue’s exceed its expenditures, and its 
national debt, which stood at $9.2 billion in 2001204 and $12.97 billion in 2004,205 
continues to grow.  According to the CIA World Factbook, unemployment in Serbia 
stood at 30 percent in 2004 and the percentage of Serbians living below the poverty level 
in 2004 was also 30 percent.206  Reintegration into the world at large, normalization of 
relations with the powerful countries of the world, and reentry into and/or assistance from 
organizations, such as the EU, the World Bank and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, are helping to make life in Serbia more bearable.  For 
Serbs, further reintegration into Europe and eventual membership in the EU will relieve 
the hardships of life in a country that is struggling economically. 
This desire to gain access to the economic advantages Europe offers was at the 
root of a rash of surrenders to the ICTY, which took place in late 2004 and into the early 
months of 2005.207  By withholding aid to Serbia and delaying the opening of 
negotiations for the signing of a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), the US 
and EU finally compelled Serbia to comply with its obligations to the ICTY.208  A 23 
May 2005 ICG report credits the Jan 2005 US State Department refusal to certify Serbian 
“compliance with conditions established by the Congress for foreign assistance” and the 
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March 2005 EU decision to tie SAA talks directly to the transfer of ICTY indictees with 
Serbia’s “policy about-face on the ICTY.”209
Prime Minister Kostunica has finally realized that his political future, as well as 
the future of the Serbian nation, rests on what course he takes regarding ICTY indictees.  
Even though he remains opposed to the ICTY and maintains a public refusal to make 
ICTY related arrests, he realizes the choice is between eight million Serbs and about 20 
ICTY indictees.210  Despite his public protests to the contrary, arrests have taken place 
under the guise of voluntary surrenders.211  Through their continual insistence of the non-
negotiable requirement that the most wanted war crimes suspects be turned over to the 
tribunal, the US, EU and the Hague prosecutor have made it clear to Kostunica and others 
in the Serbian government that if they choose the indictees, they will cause Serbia to lose 
international aid and a chance at closer ties with Europe.  
This point raises the most significant aspect of the ICTY issue and Serbia’s 
general attitude toward international institutions and law.  Serbia still doubts the 
legitimacy of the Hague Tribunal.  Strong evidence exists that most Serbians still do not 
accept that war crimes were committed by Serbians and believe that the ICTY is an anti-
Serb institution wrongfully prosecuting innocent Serbs.212  A general distrust of liberal, 
western values exists and some Serbs staunchly reject the west.213  Some of the most 
powerful politicians in Serbia today believe in “Greater Serbia” and were ardent 
supporters of Milosevic’s brutal agenda in the 1990s.214   
The question for the EU and US in examining Serbia and the ICTY is whether the 
reasons indictees are transferred matters.  If the long-term goal is achieving justice for the 
victims of war crimes in the Balkans, then how those held responsible reach the docket in 
The Hague is not important.  If, however, the goal is reforming the governments of the  
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countries of the former Yugoslavia and to have the people of the Balkans embrace 
western norms and values, then the Serbian attitude toward the ICTY and the fact that 
cooperation had to be coerced is not a good omen. 
B. KOSOVO FINAL STATUS 
Numerous works about the former Yugoslavia detail the almost fanatical 
attachment Serbs feel toward the Kosovo region of Serbia.  Kosovo is said to hold a 
special place in the hearts of all Serbs.215  This attachment to the province has resulted in 
past independence efforts by Albanians in Kosovo being swiftly, firmly, and oftentimes 
violently crushed by Serb authorities, regardless of how peaceful they were.  However, 
the Albanian drive for meaningful autonomy in Kosovo continued to escalate and 
eventually became violent in response to repression from the national government in 
Belgrade.  This eventually led to Slobodan Milosevic attempting to remove the Albanians 
from Kosovo in an ethnic cleansing campaign that resulted in the deaths of thousands of 
Kosovo Albanians.  This campaign in turn led to the March to June 1999 NATO air 
campaign that ejected Serbia from the province and established the United Nations 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in June of 1999.216  Since the establishment of UNMIK, 
Serbia has had no involvement in the province. 
In February 2005, Serbian President Boris Tadic visited Kosovo; he was the first 
Serbian head of state to visit in almost eight years.217  While in Kosovo, Tadic spoke to 
local Serbs whom he told, “this [referring to the Kosovo region] is Serbia.”  Tadic also 
insisted independence for the Kosovo region was “unacceptable.”218  Prime Minister 
Kostunica has stated that Kosovo cannot be independent as this would cause regional 
instability;219 he has recently advocated an “atypical solution” to the Kosovo impasse, 
calling for an “exceptionally high level of autonomy.”220   
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The opposite rhetoric of ethnic Albanians within Kosovo is equally adamant.  
Serbia’s Albanian minority is almost 100 percent opposed to any final solution that 
entails anything other than full independence.221  On 12 April, in response to a planned 
invitation to direct talks in Belgrade, an advisor to the President of Kosovo stated, “There 
can be no direct talks with Belgrade.  If there is eventually an international meeting to 
finalize the issue of Kosova’s independence, neighbors can take part but without a right 
to vote.”222   
Time has not eased tensions or facilitated reconciliation.  Instead, both sides are 
guilty of being reluctant to cooperate and openly express hostility toward each other.  
Serbia never accepted NATO’s to bombing as a “police action” in Kosovo and has never 
accepted the UN’s right to occupy Kosovo and create what is in reality an independent 
Kosova Albanian state, a state in which UN troops must “protect” Serb enclaves where 
the residents cannot leave their homes for fear of attack by Albanians.  The Commission 
of the European Communities annual reports, which detail Serbia’s progress toward a 
SAA, give extended treatment to Serbia’s non-compliance in regards to Kosovo.  The 
2002 report called on Serbia to dismantle the parallel government and social institutions 
it was maintaining in Kosovo.223  The parallel institutions continued to exist according to 
the 2003 report and dismantling of these institutions was among the “priority areas 
needing attention in the next 12 months.”224  As of the 2004 report, Serbia still had not 
dismantled the parallel institutions.225  A May 2005 ICG report even claims the 
government in Belgrade “actively supported and strengthened Serbian parallel structures 
in the province and blocked the work of the UN Mission (UNMIK).”226  As the 
international community has signaled its readiness to tackle the issue of Kosovo’s final 
status (and as the European community has accelerated its efforts to pull Serbia closer to 
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the EU), Belgrade seems to be softening its rhetoric toward Kosovo.  On 15 March 2005, 
the Belgrade representative for talks on the final status of the Kosovo province 
announced the position of the Serbian government as being in favor of "something more 
than autonomy, but less than independence."227
C. THE CURRENT DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION IN SERBIA  
The recent history of the Balkans has included military conflict, ethnic strife, a 
lack of democratic governance and economic struggles.  Unfortunately, many of these 
problems were either caused or exacerbated by Serbia.  Today, Serbia seems ready to 
leave its recent past behind and court Europe and the West, with hopes of membership in 
the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  
Membership in these organizations promises stability, prosperity, and peace, elements 
Serbia certainly lacks.  Serbia’s past placed it in the position of needing to make 
tremendous strides in order to qualify for membership in the EU and NATO.  In fact 
Serbia must qualify for precursor organizations as preparation for eventual membership 
in these organizations.  Serbia must make significant improvements in several areas; one 
of these areas is the building of effective democratic governance, the components of 
which, as reported in the Second Annual Report on the Stabilisation and Association 
process (SAp) for South East Europe, are 
further democratization, strengthening of institutional capacities and the 
application of the rule of law, respect for human rights, resolution of 
constitutional matters, the development of a vibrant civil society and 
independent media, respect for international obligations (e.g. ICTY) and a 
strong commitment by the political leaders to an ambitious reform 
agenda.228
Serbia is currently struggling to build a stable, functioning government with the 
ability to meet the above mentioned requirements of the SAp.    The initial SAp report 
written by the Commission of the European Community about Serbia’s status listed “the 
challenge of building effective, democratic states as the first issue under “main 
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outstanding challenges.”229  The report details the following reasons for the lack of 
effective, democratic states in the Balkan region: “fragile constitutional arrangements, 
weakness in applying the rule of law, weakness in administrative capacity, questionable 
standards of political behavior, extreme forms of nationalism, and weak civil society and 
media.”230  Subsequent reports through 2004 contend that these issues remain 
unaddressed and unresolved in Serbia. 
Even for those accustomed to western-style democracy with its inter-party 
conflict, parliamentary deadlock and bureaucratic gridlock, the inner workings of the 
Serbian government seem grossly inept and Serbia’s political culture, which is composed 
of four main features, produces consternation and frustration.   
First, the political elite cannot cooperate or compromise because they clearly hate 
one other.  This creates competition and rivalry between the more moderate and reform-
minded parties.  Some of these disagreements are rooted in differences in the political 
platform of the parties.  For instance the Democratic Party (DS) and Boris Tadic, the 
leader of the party and the current Serbian President, support faster and more far-reaching 
reform than the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), the party that “controls” parliament 
and inhabits the premiership.231  The true root of this rivalry, however, is the struggle for 
political power, which continually manifests itself as a bitter personal battle between the 
DS and DSS the two parties most capable of reforming Serbia.  This “obsession” of the 
DSS against the DS is blamed for the success of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) in the 
December 2003 elections.232  Instead of focusing on the SRS, which was the “strongest 
opposition party and their main rival for power,” Vojislav Kostunica and the DSS 
negatively attacked the DS, the party philosophically closest to them.233  The result was 
Kostunica was forced to head a minority government, thereby creating an arduous 
governing situation for himself. 
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The second important element of Serbia’s failing political culture is that the lack 
of institutional structure and resources make it extremely difficult for the Serbian people 
and politicians to progress, even in areas where there is agreement.  The lack of 
democracy in Serbia’s past, coupled with the nonexistence of well functioning 
government agencies of any kind, means that the country is basically starting from 
scratch in its efforts to build an effective, functioning democracy.  The three reports 
published on the Stabilization and Association efforts in Serbia exhibit a recurring theme 
regarding the government’s incapacity to govern effectively.  The problems are 
underscored by a lack of laws, expertise, and experience.  Even the existing laws are not 
or cannot be enforced. 
In the 2002 report, the efficiency of parliamentary structures and procedures was 
determined to be lacking and “administrative capacity, at all levels of government” was 
in need of improvement.234  The 2003 report stated “much still remains to be done, at all 
levels, to reinforce administrative capacity, especially in view of the expressed desire for 
closer relations with the EU.”235  The 2003 report notes that the slow pace of reform in 
the government administration is occurring despite EU support on some projects.  In 
2004, the report stated “the strategy for public administration reform is still delayed.”236  
This latest report attributed the problems of administrative reform to “spill-over of party 
interests into the administrative machinery, poor equipment, lack of training for civil 
servants and insufficient accountability.” 
The third factor that undermines Serbia’s political culture is corruption.  This 
deep-seated corruption in both politics and the judicial system stands as the greatest and 
probably most difficult obstacle.  Corruption permeates Serbian politics, law 
enforcement, the courts, and everyday business activities.  The main problem in Serbia is 
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the holdover of “corrupt elements of the old regime.”237  These elements are present from 
the top down, in parliament, the military, and the criminal justice system. 
Finally, the fourth factor that degrades Serbian political culture is nationalism, 
which both hinders progress and causes political division.  As long as ultranationalist 
politician Vojislav Seselj (currently on trial at The Hague) and his proxy Tomislav 
Nikolic can auction their brand of uncompromising nationalism in the guise of the SRS, 
the wars in Croatia and Bosnia will remain open wounds and the situation in Kosovo has 
the potential to explode into violence once again.  The DSS, while not as far to the right 
as the radicals, is also a home to nationalists and these nationalist sympathies keep the 
DSS from uniting with the DS and creating an even stronger governing coalition with the 
power to generate needed reform. 
Today, Serbia is left with a radical party that possesses the largest number of seats 
in the parliament and seemingly will gain even more in the next election.238  Second in 
popularity, according to a Faktor Plus poll released on 22 April, is the Democratic Party 
of Boris Tadic, which is poised to take approximately 23 percent of the vote and about 55 
of the 250 parliamentary seats.239  A new development is the growing popularity of 
Snaga Srbije, a new party headed by Bogoljub Karic, a wealthy Serbian businessman and 
former Milosevic crony who fled from Serbia in 2001 fearing for his life after 
Milosevic’s fall.240  Karic, now back in Serbia, is a popular politician who stands poised 
to bring his new party (styled after Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia) approximately 16 
percent of a potential vote and approximately 40 parliamentary seats.241  Karic’s 
popularity may simply lie in his ability to offer voters an alternative to the politicians 
who have so far been unable to improve living conditions in Serbia.  Kostunica’s DSS 
may garner approximately nine percent of the votes in the next parliamentary election 
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and is currently the only member party of the ruling coalition that would be represented 
in parliament.242
Nationalism does not only manifest itself in the popularity of the SRS.  The ICTY 
and those Serbs who have been indicted by it are greatly supported by nationalist 
elements within the government.  This brings about interesting developments within the 
Serbian parliament, where PM Kostunica, when he is attempting to pass legislation with 
nationalistic overtones, finds his support ensuing from the SRS instead of the parties in 
his governing coalition.  This happened during the debate on the Law on the Rights of 
ICTY Indictees, a piece of legislation that obligates the government to compensate Serbs 
on trial at The Hague for “lost salaries, plus help for spouses, siblings, parents, and 
children for flight and hotel costs [when visiting the indictee], telephone and mail bills, 
visa fees, and legal charges," including lawyers' and advisers' fees.”243  Kostunica was 
only able to have the law passed after the Radical party gave him the votes his coalition 
members refused to give. 
Serbia still has much work to complete to institute the changes necessary to bring 
it into the European fold.  This is the main reason that talk of EU and NATO accession at 
this point for any of the nations in the Western Balkans, with the exception of Croatia, is 
very premature.  The EU, however, has broached this issue.  As Patrick Moore wrote in 
an RFE/FRL article, “‘Europe’ is a word with connotations that border on magic in 
Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Kosova, Montenegro, and Serbia.”244 As long as the box is 
open, and the EU aspirants in the Western Balkans want admittance so badly, the EU has 
the upper hand and should use it to the advantage of everyone who wants peace, stability, 
reform and recovery in that part of the world.  Through the SAp, the EU can force Serbia 
along the right path and must encourage the United States to use its influence to the same 
end. 
The EU must use its wealth and position to provide economic assistance to 
improve people’s lives in tangible ways, making Serbia a nation where people can live in  
242 Ibid. 
243 RFE/RL Website, Serbian Parliament Votes to Pay Indicted War Criminals, 
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2004/03/4-SEE/see-310304.asp.  Accessed 17 November 2005. 
244 Patrick Moore, Balkans: A ‘European’ Model, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticleprint/2005/05.  Accessed 15 
May 2005 
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peace and prosperity.  The focus must be on reformation, creating a better standard of 
living and assisting Serbia to stand on its own and to develop a sense of self that does not 
feed off suffering and a need to “defend” itself against those who have a different 
viewpoint on contentious issues. 
At the same time the EU must force Serbia to establish an internal commitment to 
rectify its own failings and sectarianism.  This means that the political elites must be 
committed to reforming and restructuring the whole nation.  Political reformation will 
spread a domino effect of benefits throughout the country.  For instance, reforming the 
judicial system will encourage foreign investment.  Thus those who legally profit from 
foreign investments could do business without the crushing effects of corruption.  They 
can emerge as the middle class.  This middle class will in turn prod Serbia in the political 
and economic direction the western governments seek. 
What will move Serbia moving in the right direction?  The first factor is Boris 
Tadic.  A coalition of the DS, Snaga Srbije, G17+ (if they can reach the five percent 
margin), and SPO/NS is the answer for Serbia’s future.  The ICG Europe Briefing, 22 
July 2004, stated that Boris Tadic is “soft-spoken and unassuming, he is widely perceived 
as a pragmatic and cool-headed politician.”245  Tadic has the vision and experience 
necessary to make an honest and concerted effort toward reform and progress.  His past 
includes experience as a political activist, defense minister, and telecommunications 
minister.246  With the support of the Serbian citizenry who contributed to the downfall of 
Slobodan Milosevic, Tadic would have the mandate to move Serbia forward. 
A second imperative factor is that there must be one “democratic party.”  The 
current situation, with four liberal and quasi-liberal parties that are identified as 
democratic, splits the vote and enables the radicals to continue to have a strong and 
sometimes controlling presence in the parliament.  PM Vojislav Kostunica was the right 
man at the right time to help the Serbian people overthrow Slobodan Milosevic.  
However, during his time as Prime Minister Kostunica has been unable to affect change 
and even seems to doubt the necessity of far-reaching reform in Serbia. 
 




                                                
The DSS must overcome its self-destructive rivalry with the DS.  According to 
reports recently published on the RFE/RFL website, the DSS is the only party in the 
current ruling coalition that would surpass the required five percent vote requirement to 
remain in government.  Kostunica and his party are steadily losing voters as Tadic and 
the DS gain popularity.247  The DSS must strongly consider making peace with the DS in 
order to survive and maintain its precarious hold on power.  If the DSS compromises 
now, it can at least cling on to the PM position.  If it waits until after elections, it will 
likely be the smallest party in any potential democratic bloc and will lose the right to the 
premiership. 
Whoever emerges as the candidate Serbs choose to take them forward must 
accomplish several tasks.  First, corruption must be eliminated from the political arena 
and from the justice system.  Second, foreign aid should be used to encourage 
entrepreneurship and small businesses.  Next, state revenues should be used to create 
social safety nets such as health care and unemployment insurance.  Fourth, true civil 
society with the full involvement of Serbian citizens and not foreign NGOs must be 
fostered.  Finally, Serbian culture must be reinvented without the heavy reliance on the 
Serb as victim/warrior myth.  The EU is a very long-term goal.  Presently, Serbs must 
focus on taking small careful steps away from the 1990s and toward becoming, in the 
words of Vojislav Kostunica, “a normal boring state.”248
Although the ICTY and Kosovo are the two main issues through which Serbia 
interacts with the international community, there are other areas in which a tremendous 
amount of work must be accomplished.  Corruption is still rampant throughout the police, 
judiciary, and government of Serbia.  Most reports on Serbia focus on the continued 
influence and power exercised by Milosevic supporters and cronies within all segments 
of Serbian society.  It is not surprising that the ICG chooses such phrases as “Serbia’s U-
Turn,” “Serbian Reform Stalls Again,” and “Serbia: Spinning Its Wheels” for the titles of 
reports on Serbia.  Serbia has not made the fundamental changes necessary to chart a new 
 
247 RFE/RL, Newsline Vol. 9, No. 76, Part II, 22 April 2005. 
248 Eric D. Gordy, “Building a ‘Normal, Boring’ Country: Kostunica’s Yugoslavia,” Current History 100, 
(March 2001): 109. 
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course.  The EU reports on Serbian efforts toward a SAA, in most respects have read the 
same for the last three years—the same issues remain unresolved year after year. 
Even when problems are addressed through new laws, it is difficult to get the new 
laws passed and those that make it through the parliament are oftentimes not enforced or 
there is “coexistence of new legislation and obsolete laws.”  Another ploy used to dilute 
reform is to write new laws in a way that makes them weak or unenforceable.249   
One report from the ICG estimates that only 71 parliamentary seats are occupied 
by members of parties that truly want reform.250  The remaining 179 parliamentarians 
belong to parties steeped in corruption, parties that are not committed to Euro-Atlantic 
integration for Serbia and would like to maintain the status quo. 
 
 
249 Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Paper, Serbia and Montenegro 
Stabilization and Association Report, 2004, 10. 
250 International Crisis Group, “ Serbia’s U-Turn,” 9. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
But I would personally consider that the first responsibility for a 
democratic state is to exist as such.  And, for that purpose institutions are 
needed: that is the first priority.  The second step is to have the 
institutions, including the defense and security ones to function properly 
and democratically.  Nothing can be imposed from the outside until then, 
except the need for democratic institutions and certainly not incentives to 
participate to external operations…Defense institution building needs to 
be the aim, and I would say the unique, objective of the coming decade for 
most of the countries of the region.251
Despite the efforts of NATO, the EU, the OSCE and many other organizations 
working to establish strong democratic traditions in Serbia, the prospects for successful 
reform are less than ideal in the middle of the first decade of the 21st century.  The 
country remains unable to overcome its heritage of conflict and instability.  Five years 
after Slobodan Milosevic was overthrown, there has been no significant progress made in 
Serbia’s efforts to adopt Western values and modes of management of its security 
sector—or any other portions of its governing bureaucracy in need of reform.  Despite the 
decision to negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement with Serbia and 
Montenegro in October 2005, the EU reports that: 
The reform of the military continues to meet with significant resistance 
and obstruction from some political actors and elements within the army 
itself. The adoption of the military doctrine is pending. Despite efforts 
undertaken, the State Union parliamentary committee which is supposed 
to ensure democratic control over the military continues to be weak. This 
is a source of serious concern.  There is still resistance within the military 
system to the rule of law and cooperation with the ICTY.252
This lack of progress, coupled with the failure to arrest Bosnian Serbs Radovan 
Karadzic and Ratko Mladic and extradite them to The Hague will continue to prevent 
integration into NATO and EU structures. The contrast in this connection with the long 
awaited arrest in late-2005 of Croatian General Ante Gotovina is striking.  
 
251 Alain Faupin, “Defense Concepts and Structure Reforms in South East Europe,” Transforming National 
Armed Forces in South East Europe-From the Social to the Military Challenge, 9th Workshop of the Study Group 
“Regional Stability in South East Europe”, Vienna and Sofia, April 2005. 
252 European Commission, Serbia and Montenegro 2005 Progress Report, 9 November 2005, 14.  Although the 
Defense Ministry is a State Union competency, Serbia controls 95 percent of the defense sector and therefore is in 
control of all developments within the military sphere.  Italics added by author. 
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Ongoing security sector reform efforts in Serbia will continue to struggle and fail 
for many more years.  There are two reasons why international organizations currently 
operating SSR programs in Serbia will not succeed in their reform agenda.  The first 
reason is the entrenched, undemocratic nature of the Serbian security sector. 
The security sector shortcomings evident in Serbia today are a result of a 
communist legacy and over ten years spent under an authoritarian nationalist.  Under the 
communist system, loyalty to the ruling elite and a willingness to help that elite maintain 
power were the key requirements for membership in security related careers.  Under 
Slobodan Milosevic, the military’s desire to hold Yugoslavia together was manipulated 
with horrific consequences.  The majority of Yugoslavs who committed war crimes were 
affiliated with the military and police system.  The democratic failings of the military and 
police sectors were further exacerbated by the absence of the rule of law.   
The second reason that ongoing SSR efforts have not fared better and will not 
make great strides in the near future is the immaturity of Serbia’s democracy and the 
corruption and political infighting that dominate the government bureaucracy.  The 
Serbian government does not speak with a unified voice and is unable to pursue policies 
agreed upon by a majority of parliamentarians.  The government in Belgrade is 
dysfunctional and it will take additional years of practice for democracy to take hold. 
The individuals who have maintained power and “control” of the political system 
for the last two years have been unwilling and unable to implement reform because of 
two significant fears.  The first fear is a loss of power.  Anti-western elements make up 
the largest block in the legislature and any attempt to bring about large scale changes 
might result in the collapse of the government.  The moderates in power would prefer to 
maintain control of the government than risk removal from office.  The second fear is the 
danger inherent in attempting to bring about change.  The assassination of PM Zoran 
Djindjic demonstrated both the ability and determination of influential criminal elements 
to prevent the rule of law being adopted. 
Security sector reform programs and other attempts to implement what would 
amount to revolutionary change in Serbia will remain unsuccessful until the political will 
exists to make them happen.  The situation in Serbia will remain unchanged unless there 
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develops a popular movement for change.  EU and NATO integration of former 
Yugoslav member states will serve as an impetus for change in Serbia.  As Croatia and 
Macedonia move closer to and attain EU and NATO membership, the prosperity and 
opportunities inherent in membership will, for the first time, touch Serbia’s borders.  
Surely the march of progress in the form of the blue EU flag waving at Serbian border 
crossings will finally spur concrete democracy-based programs and policies to succeed as 
they have done elsewhere in central and Eastern Europe against great odds. 
Despite assistance from numerous international organizations, access to a wealth 
of information about how to reform, clear statements about what is expected, significant 
financial assistance, and even affiliation with NATO and EU programs such as the SEEI, 
the situation in Serbia today remains fundamentally unchanged.  The ongoing security 
sector reform programs have had little impact.  The military and police organs are still 
dominated by a network of criminals and powerbrokers that are far from being 
neutralized.  Until the political and popular demand for change that was the key element 
of democratic revolutions across Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s and 
beginning of the 1990s takes hold in Serbia, much of the efforts of outside individuals 
and organization will be unsuccessful.  In addition, the lack of resolution on the final 
status of Kosovo also serves as a destabilizing and divisive force in Serbia. 
Over the next five to ten years, as Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Macedonia 
move closer to EU and NATO integration (as applicable), Serbia will find itself 
surrounded by wealthier more stable nations that will insist on a stable and prosperous 
Balkan region.  While the integration outcome is by no means inevitable, there are and 
will be many forces working in its favor that will be difficult for Serbia to resist.  The 
SSR efforts in Serbia will, over time become increasingly effective due to political and 
social pressures for change.  Security sector reform shall continue to be a key aspect of 
Serbia’s Western integration, just as it remains a requirement for democratic statecraft 
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